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DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS 
The following are the definitions of concepts used from time to time in this dissertation: 
 An accounting authority is the head or a board of a public entity, which in the case of 
SASSA is the chief executive officer (CEO) (South Africa 1999). 
 
 An administrative non-compliance penalty, as defined by section 208 of the Tax 
Administration Act, 2011, is a penalty imposed by SARS resulting from applying an 
applicable non-compliance penalty ranging from R250 to R16    . 
 
 Agency, for the purposes of this study sometimes used for referring to SASSA. 
 
 A BEE certificate is a certificate issued by a registered auditor for confirming the BEE 
status level of an exempt micro-enterprise (EME) (National Treasury 2011:8). 
 
 Black economic empowerment (BEE) is the viable economic empowerment of all black 
people (in particular women, workers, youth, people with a disability and people living in 
rural areas) through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies (South Africa 
       
 
 A chain of evidence is a tool designed for making it is easier for the researcher to follow 
the source of any evidence from initial questions to an ultimate case-study conclusion 
(Yin 2012).  
 
 Construct validity is the extent to which the results of a test are related to an underlying 
set of related variables (Salkind 2014:174). 
 
 Corruption is a vicious and fraudulent intention to evade the prohibitions of the law (Law 
dictionary        
 
 COSO, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, is a 
joint initiative of five private-sector organisations, established in the United States of 
America, dedicated to providing thought leadership to executive management and 
governance entities on critical aspects of organisational governance, business ethics, 
internal control, enterprise risk management, fraud, and financial reporting. COSO 
ix 
 
established a common internal-control model against which companies and 
organisations may assess their control systems (Bediako 2014). 
 
 A database is a collection of information that is organised so that it can easily be 
accessed, managed and updated (Rouse 2006). 
 
 Enterprise risk management is a risk strategy seeking to integrate the management of 
all the risks faced by an organisation, which inherently requires the alignment of risk 
management with corporate governance and strategy (Bromiley, McShane, Nair & 
Rustambekov 2015). 
 
 Exempted micro-enterprises (EMEs) are enterprises with a turnover of R10 million or 
less per annum (DTI 2013:8). 
 
 The explanation-analytical technique is a technique where a theoretically-based 
proposition is formulated and tested by collecting data through an initial case study in 
order to be able to compare the findings with this theoretically-based proposition 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009:501). 
 
 Explanation building is a special type of pattern matching aimed at analysing data by 
building an explanation of the case in hand (Yin 2012:141). 
 
 Fraud is defined as the intentional making of an unlawful misrepresentation that actually 
causes, or potentially can cause, another person to act to his or her detriment (Louw 
         
 
 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as defined by section 1 of the Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999, is an expenditure made in vain and would have been 
avoided had reasonable care been exercised. 
 
 Intentional tax evasion includes actions intended to reduce or extinguish the amount 
that should be paid, or which inflate the amount of a refund that is correctly refundable to 
the taxpayer. The most severe penalty is reserved for cases where a taxpayer acted with 
the intention to evade tax (SARS 2013b:81). 
 
x 
 
 
 Internal control is a process effected by a company‟s board of directors, management 
and other personnel for providing reasonable assurances regarding the achievement of 
objectives (Jackson & Stent 2012: ). 
 
 Irregular expenditure, as defined by section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act, 
1999, is expenditure other than unauthorised expenditure, incurred in contravention of, or 
not in accordance with, a requirement of any applicable legislation. 
 
 Multiple sources of evidence is a technique in which two or more sources of data, for 
example documentation and direct observation, are used in one study (Saunders et al 
           
 
 The Oracle system is a system used by SASSA for processing financial transactions, 
accounting and reporting (SASSA 2017). 
 
 The pattern-matching technique is a predictive approach to an intervention in that it 
specifies post-intervention results that would show either effects or no effects (Yin 
           
 
 A preferential procurement policy is a procurement policy providing for categories of 
preference in the allocation of contracts and the protection or advancement of persons or 
categories of person disadvantaged by unfair discrimination (South Africa 1996, 2000). 
 
 Procurement is a process that creates, manages and fulfils contracts relating to the 
provision of goods or services (National Treasury          
 
 Reasonable care not taken - reasonable care is not defined, so the ordinary meaning 
must apply. Taxpayers are legally responsible for their tax affairs. A taxpayer must take 
reasonable care in keeping records and in providing SARS with complete and accurate 
information. Reasonable care means that a taxpayer is required to take the degree of 
care that a reasonable, ordinary person in the circumstances of the taxpayer would take 
to fulfil his or her tax obligations (SARS 2013b:80). 
 
xi 
 
 Risk management is a systematic process for identifying, evaluating and addressing 
risks on a continuous basis before such risks can have a negative impact on the 
institution's service-delivery capacity (National Treasury 2015b). 
 
 A Risk-management framework refers to all the structures, processes, systems, 
methodology and individuals involved used by an organisation for implementing its risk-
management strategy (Coetzee, Du Bruyn, Fourie & Plant 2012:15). 
 
 Schedule-3A national public entities are entities established in terms of the Public 
Finance Management Act,       
 
  A substantial understatement, as defined by section 221 of the Tax Administration Act 
28 of 2011,  is where the prejudice to SARS or the fiscus exceeds the greater of five per 
cent of the amount of “tax” properly chargeable or refundable under the tax Act for the 
relevant tax period, or R1 million.  
 
 Supply-chain management (SCM) is the design, planning, execution, control and 
monitoring of supply-chain activities in the delivery of goods, services or works, with the 
objective of creating net value and providing oversight and co-ordination of information 
and finances within the supply chain (National Treasury        
 
 Tax avoidance is where the taxpayer arranged his or her affairs in a perfectly legal 
manner so that the taxpayer has either reduced his or her income or has no income on 
which tax is payable (Stiglingh, Koekemoer, Van Zyl, Wilcocks & De Swardt            
 
 A tax-clearance certificate is a document issued by SARS confirming that the 
applicant‟s tax affairs are in order (Lubbe 2013). 
 
 Tax evasion is an illegal activity deliberately undertaken by a taxpayer to free him- or 
herself from a tax burden (Stiglingh et al 2017). 
 
xii 
 
 Triangulation refers to the use of different data-collection techniques within one study in 
order to ensure that the data are telling what you think that they are telling you (Saunders 
et al 2009:146). 
 
 An understatement penalty, as defined by section 222(2) of the Tax Administration Act, 
2011, is an amount resulting from applying the highest applicable understatement-
penalty percentage (200%). 
 
 The voluntary-disclosure programme was an interim voluntary-disclosure programme 
that expired in October 2011, whereupon a permanent legislative framework for voluntary 
disclosure applying to all types of tax was included in the Tax Administration Act. 2011. 
The main purpose of such a framework is to enhance voluntary compliance in the 
interest of good management of the tax system and the best use of SARS‟s resources  It 
seeks to encourage taxpayers to come forward and avoid the future imposition of 
understatement penalties, other administrative penalties and interest (SARS 2013b). 
 
  
xiii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated and examined the effectiveness and implementation of the existing 
internal controls designed specifically for exempted micro-enterprises (EMEs) contracting with 
the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), in order to minimise the risk of possible 
tax evasion within the supply-chain management (SCM) processes. The research was 
completed by conducting a document review and face-to-face interviews with SASSA‟s SCM 
practitioners, risk manager, fraud and corruption manager, internal-control manager and 
internal auditor in order to identify risks of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes. It 
was concluded that there is a risk of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes due to the 
ineffectiveness and inconsistent implementation of internal controls designed for EMEs 
contracting with SASSA. This risk could be minimised by incorporating possible anti-tax-
evasion procedures in the risk-assessment process, and ultimately in SASSA‟s broader fraud 
and corruption strategies. Such procedures should then help minimise funds being lost to the 
fiscus due to tax evasion in the SCM processes.   
 
Key words/terms  
possible tax evasion  
ineffectiveness 
inconsistent implementation 
internal controls 
corruption 
fraud 
exempted micro-enterprises  
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SCM processes 
  
 
CHAPTER 1:  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
South Africa's first democratic government, elected in 1994, had a clear mandate to redress 
the inequalities of the past in every sphere (political, social and economic), so as to transform 
the country's economy (DTI          From then on, government embarked on a 
comprehensive programme to provide a legislative framework for transforming the country's 
economy (DTI          
 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) in South Africa has been one of the tools used for 
redressing the inequalities of the past and transforming the massive imbalances in society 
(DTI 2003:13). This policy helps small businesses to overcome market-access challenges and 
allows government to work on transforming the economy. Any company wishing to bid for 
work with government must prove its BEE compliance before being able to participate in the 
process (DTI            
 
In 1997, government issued a green paper on public-sector procurement reform, a policy 
document recognising that government, as the largest buyer of goods and services in the 
economy, had the responsibility to leverage this purchasing power in support of its economic-
policy objectives of , small-enterprise development, and labour-intensive construction (DTI 
        
 
Mechanisms were introduced to give effect to a preferential-procurement policy: the tendering 
process was made more accessible to black people, tenders were “unbundled” into smaller 
tenders to allow smaller enterprises to tender for work, and a point system was introduced to 
award tenders on the basis of a combination of price and preference for targeted groups (DTI 
       
 
The last-mentioned mechanism was given legislative force with the enactment of the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 in 2000 (DTI      , the objective of 
which was to use the purchasing powers of government as a tool for small-business 
development, and which referred to preferential procurement as the acquisition of goods and 
services by an organ of state. This Act also provided that an organ of state must use the 
preferential point system when awarding contracts. 
  
 
 
Furthermore, in order to promote the purposes of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, codes of good practice pertaining to BEE were issued, 
including the interpretation and definition of both BEE and different categories of black-
empowerment entity. These codes resulted in the establishment of exempted micro-
enterprises (EMEs) for procurement purposes. 
 
Exempted micro-enterprises (EMEs) 
 
In terms of the codes of good practice issued in section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act,     , an EME is any enterprise with an annual total revenue of 
R10 million or less (DTI          Where this study focuses on EMEs contracting with SASSA, 
mention may be made of some of the day-to-day goods and services procured from EMEs by 
SASSA, namely  
 
 stationery 
 catering 
 printing 
 blankets for elderly people 
 food parcels for prospective beneficiaries waiting for the grant application process 
to be completed 
 office furniture 
 renovations   
 installation of CCTV  
 office-space rental 
 
The term “exempted micro-enterprise” is used in the government procurement system for BEE 
purposes. EMEs are registered with the Company and Intellectual Property Commission 
(CIPC) as companies or close corporations and must comply with South African laws, 
including the Companies Act 71 of 2008, Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962, as amended, and Value Added Tax 89 of 1991.  
 
EMEs enter into a contract with SASSA as companies or close corporations, and not as sole 
traders or partnerships which, unlike EMEs, are not regulated through the CIPC. Any mention 
of the word “business” will imply that it is a company or a close corporation that is referred to. 
  
 
 
By law, an EME is required to lodge its annual return with the CIPC every year within the 
anniversary month of the entity‟s incorporation  Such a return contains a summary of the latest 
information about the entity, with the only financial information included relating to the entity‟s 
turnover.  
 
The annual return should however not be confused with the income-tax return, which focuses 
on an entity‟s taxable income used for determining its tax liability and must be submitted to the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS). These two types of return have different purposes 
and different administrative processes, so that compliance with the one type does not mean 
compliance with the other. (CIPC 2009:2.)  
 
When submitting an income-tax return, an EME could, in terms of the Income Tax Act, 1962, 
as amended, be assessed for tax purposes as either a small business corporation (SBC) (s 
12E(4)), a micro-business (part IV), or a normal business . The type of tax system that will 
apply is dependent on both the gross income for the year under assessment and the fulfilment 
of other requirements.  
 
An EME qualifies as an SBC when its gross income does not exceed R20 million for a 
particular tax year. Each EME‟s tax liability is determined by applying the micro-business, SBC 
or normal-business tax system, depending on the system that the EME qualifies to register for 
in terms of the Income Tax Act, 1962, as amended. 
 
It should be noted that the R20-million threshold applies to businesses for tax purposes, and 
that the R10-million threshold is used in the SCM environment for assessing whether a 
business qualifies as an EME or not.  
 
Confirming whether the income-tax return has been completed in full, if at all, and reflects the 
true tax position of the EME concerned, is a challenge for SARS, and in some instances 
results in possible tax evasion being committed and amounts of money being lost to the fiscus. 
It is because of this challenge that this study seeks to come up with proposals for dealing with 
the possibility of declaring an untruthful income, or possible tax evasion, by EMEs contracting 
with SASSA.  
 
Below follows a further discussion of SASSA. 
 
  
 
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) 
 
SASSA is a government entity established in terms of the South African Social Security 
Agency Act 9 of 2004b, as an agent for the administration and payment of social assistance 
and all related matters (SASSA 2014:15). As part of its business, SASSA procures goods and 
services to be used by various branches through the SCM department (SASSA     b      
 
Figure 1 below illustrates how SASSA‟s budget is broken down up to the budget for goods 
and services acquired from the EMEs: 
 
Figure 1: Budget allocation 
 
 
                                       Less 
                                      Less 
 
 
 
 
                              Equals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig 1: Compiled by the researcher from National Treasury     a) 
 
The estimated budget allocation for SASSA for the 2017/18 financial year is R7.6846 billion, of 
which 57%, namely  R4.4099 billion, is spent on goods and services (National Treasury 
    a:334). An estimated additional R600 million for social relief of distress (SRD) is also 
R7. 6846 Billion 
(SASSA budget allocation) 
R3. 2747 Billion 
(SASSA Salaries) 
43% of the total budget 
 
R4. 4099 Billion 
(Goods and services) 
57% of the total 
budget 
 
R2.1512 billion 
(goods and services from the 
EMEs) 
28% of the total budget 
R2. 2587 Billion 
(CPS service fees) 
29% of the total budget 
  
 
spent on goods and services through SASSA SCM processes, but is allocated in the budget of 
the National Department of Social Development (National Treasury     a        
 
R2.     billion (i.e.   % of the total estimated budget allocation) is allocated to goods and 
services normally provided to SASSA by EMEs on a day-to-day basis. This amount (i.e. 
R2.1512 billion) was arrived at by reducing the total estimated budget for goods and services 
by R2.2587 billion allocated to the services rendered to SASSA by the cash paymaster 
services (CPS) (National Treasury     a).  
 
The CPS is contracted to SASSA for distributing social grants to those eligible for them, but 
not for providing the goods and services mentioned earlier on in section 1.1 of this study. The 
contract between the two entities, amounting to over R2 billion (Mckune 2017), is not 
discussed in this study because it does not meet the criterion set by the codes of good 
practice for EMEs (DTI          
 
Supply-chain management (SCM) 
 
In terms of section 51(iii) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, as amended, and 
section 217(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as changed by law in 
2005, the accounting authority of any public entity (which in SASSA‟s case is its chief 
executive officer [CEO]) has a duty to ensure that a sound SCM is established in his or her 
entity to implement those sections. 
 
Like any other organ of state, SASSA must develop its own procurement policies and 
procedures in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000, and the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 2003. Once these policies and procedures have been developed, internal 
controls must be in place to ensure adherence to these policies and procedures, and to 
prevent and detect any kind of fraud in the procurement processes (National Treasury 
          
 
The following points are of relevance as far as SASSA‟s procurement of goods and services is 
concerned:  
 
 As from 1 April 2016, it may consider an EME as a prospective supplier of goods or 
services only after that EME having been registered on the central supplier database 
  
 
(CSD), which is a central database for all suppliers intending to do business with the 
state and is controlled by the National Treasury (National Treasury 2016c:1). The 
purpose of the CSD is to improve the levels of compliance in all spheres, including tax 
compliance, and to confirm the BEE status of the EME with the CIPC (National Treasury 
2016c:3). 
 
 In terms of SASSA‟s SCM policy, the procurement of goods and services at SASSA is 
done by way of either quotations or a bidding process and must be within the threshold 
values as determined by the National Treasury from time to time (SASSA 2016b:10). Bid 
documents or quotations are accepted only from EMEs registered on the CSD (National 
Treasury 2016c:2). EMEs not registered on the CSD are not considered for procurement 
purposes at SASSA.  
 
 One written quotation from the database of suppliers is required when procuring goods 
or services of a rand value up to R2 000, and at least three written quotations are 
required when procuring goods or services of a rand value of R2 001 up to R500 000 
(SASSA 2016b). 
 
 The procedure to be followed in the bidding process for procuring goods or services 
above R500 000 includes the following: an open and transparent pre-qualification 
process, a competitive bidding process in which only pre-qualified organisations may 
participate, and criteria for the evaluation of bids in order to identify the bid that 
represents the best value for money (SASSA 2016b:11).   
 
 SASSA can still procure goods and services without following the normal procurement 
processes mentioned above in instances where it is impractical for the entity to use three 
quotations to procure goods and services, or to invite bids (SASSA 2016b). 
 
When obtaining a procurement contract from SASSA, the following factors apply: 
 
 Service providers with a bid or quotation for goods and services exceeding R30 000 
must comply with the SASSA administrative requirements by submitting all the required 
documents, including the original tax-clearance certificate obtained from SARS (SASSA 
2016b:10).  
 
  
 
 Service providers bidding for goods and services less than R30 000 are not required by 
the SASSA policy to submit a tax-clearance certificate obtained from SARS (SASSA 
2016b). 
 
 All qualifying bids are assessed in two stages: first for functionality, and secondly in 
accordance with the 80/20 or 90/10 preference point systems prescribed in Preferential 
Procurement Regulations 5 and 6 (SASSA 2016b:16). 
 
 The 80/20 preference point system is applicable to bids with a rand value between R30 
000 and R1 million, meaning that 80% of the points must be awarded for the price and 
quality of goods and services, and 20% for achieving specific goals, including, among 
others, contracting enterprises wholly- or partially-owned by previously- disadvantaged 
people (in terms of s 1 of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003, 
“disadvantaged people” refers to all black people -- particularly women, workers, youths, 
people with a disability and people living in rural areas). The principle of the 80/20 
preference point system also applies to the 90/10 preference point system, although the 
latter system is applicable to bids above R1 million (SASSA 2016b). 
 
Once the bidding process has been completed, the bidder with the highest total number of 
points in terms of the preference point system is awarded a contract (SASSA 2016b:19). 
 
Between its establishment in April 2006 and 30 June 2016, SASSA contracted over 10 000 
EMEs to provide goods and services ranging from catering to the renting of offices, and to 
ensure that shelter and food was provided to the beneficiaries and SASSA‟s administrative 
staff (SASSA 2017). 
 
While the South African government has been focusing on the economic inequalities of the 
past, SARS has been pressurised to improve the levels of revenue collection. SASSA is 
namely at risk of losing an estimated 28% of its budget a year because of corrupt activities 
within the SCM processes.  
 
This coming financial year (2017/18), the amount concerned is R2.152 billion, and because 
this amount is allocated solely to goods and services normally provided by EMEs. if it is then 
lost because of corrupt activities, including possible tax evasion by EMEs, it could have a 
serious impact on the revenue collection of this country. According to Fagariba (2016:116), tax 
evasion is one of the greatest obstacles as far as collecting more revenue is concerned, while 
  
 
according to Litina and Palivos (2016:164), the most common factor contributing to tax 
evasion is corruption. 
 
The above argument was confirmed by SARS in its 2014/15 strategic plan (SARS 2015:14), 
where it was stated that corruption in government poses a serious risk, ultimately possibly 
affecting the entity‟s ability to achieve compliance due to a loss of public confidence in 
government.  
 
According to Stiglingh, Koekemoer, Van Zyl, Wilcocks and De Swardt (2017:797), tax evasion 
is an illegal activity deliberately undertaken by a taxpayer to free him- or herself from a tax 
burden and if discovered is regarded as a criminal offence, punishable in terms of sections 
234 and 235 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. The responsibility for combating fraud- 
and corruption-related activities such as tax evasion was delegated to all government 
departments and entities in terms of the  Public Finance Management Act, 1999. 
 
Internal controls 
 
Section 51(1)(a)(i) of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, reads as follows: 
 
An accounting authority for a public entity must ensure that that public entity has and maintains 
effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal 
control. 
 
Therefore, in terms of the above-mentioned Act, it is the responsibility of SASSA‟s CEO to 
ensure that the entity has, and maintains, effective, efficient and transparent systems of 
financial and risk management and internal controls for dealing with any possibility of fraud 
and corruption within the entity‟s SCM, which will indirectly eradicate tax evasion   
 
Although it is not SASSA‟s mandate to develop internal controls for possible tax evasion (that 
is SARS‟s prerogative , through this study the entity could help SARS minimise possible tax 
evasion by improving the existing internal controls within SASSA‟s SCM so that more revenue 
could be collected from EMEs contracting with SASSA. 
 
According to Jackson and Stent (      ,  , “internal controls” are policies and procedures put 
in place by an organisation to help it function in an orderly and efficient manner. Examples 
given include internal controls for 
  
 
 
 adherence to management policies, applicable laws and legislation 
 the safeguarding of assets 
 the prevention and detection of fraud and error 
 the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records 
 the timely preparation of reliable financial and other information necessary for 
running the business 
 
The link between possible tax evasion and internal controls  
 
The link between possible tax evasion and SASSA‟s SCM internal controls is as follows  
 
When an EME conceals certain information from SARS (by for instance intentionally declaring 
a false income) in order to get a good-standing tax-compliance status with which to secure a 
contract with SASSA, such an EME contravenes section 25(2) of the Tax Administration Act, 
2011, which stipulates that any tax-related return must be completed in full and must reflect 
the true position of the taxpayer.  
 
If this concealment is discovered by SARS, through either an audit or other methods, the 
amount omitted will be included in the gross income of the taxpayer in terms of section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act,     , as amended, which defines a resident‟s gross income as including the 
total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such a resident 
during the year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature. 
 
The revenue received by an EME in the process of carrying on its business is regarded as 
being of a revenue nature and is taxable, irrespective of whether the revenue was received 
from illegal business activities or not (SARS 2014a:9). This means that if an EME unlawfully 
secured a contract by submitting false information (eg an illegally-obtained tax-clearance 
certificate) to SASSA), the revenue derived from this contract will be included in the gross 
profit of the EME and be subjected to tax. 
 
After having discussed BEE, EMEs and how they are taxed, SASSA‟s SCM processes, 
internal controls and what normally causes tax evasion, now follows a discussion that will 
highlight the problem that prompted this study.  
 
   
 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
From the 2012/2013 to the 2015/16 financial year, SASSA‟s irregular expenditure reportedly 
increased from R10 million to R1 billion, which is far too high an amount. Also, the number of 
fraud and corruption cases increased every year. (SASSA     ; SASSA 2016a.)  
 
The increasing trend of irregular expenditure indicates that SASSA acquired goods and 
services from the suppliers without following the SCM policies, processes and procedures 
(Auditor General         .  
 
The abuse of SCM processes could be attributed to a number of possibilities: it could be either 
because of a complete lack of internal controls, a lack of effective internal controls or the non-
implementation of effective controls, or because of fraud and corruption activities within 
SASSA, possibly involving dishonesty, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of certain 
information or fraud committed by the EMEs when contracting with the entity concerned.  
 
The chances are very high that these corruption activities could lead to possible tax evasion 
within SASSA‟s SCM process. In order to try to minimise the risk of possible tax evasion within 
the SCM process and to prevent further loss to the fiscus, SASSA‟s SCM internal controls 
should be investigated and examined. 
  
This study investigated and examined the effectiveness and consistent implementation of the 
existing internal controls designed specifically for EMEs contracting with SASSA for 
minimising the possibility of tax evasion. It was in that context that it was investigated how the 
existing internal controls could be improved, or how alternative fraud, corruption and anti-tax-
evasion measures could be introduced by SASSA‟s SCM as controls for minimising the 
possibility of tax evasion by EMEs contracting with SASSA. 
 
  
   
 
1.3.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In view of the research problem, the following three research questions were asked:  
 
 How do various scholars view tax evasion and public procurement in general? 
 
 How do the participants view the effectiveness and implementation of internal controls 
designed for minimising possible tax evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes? 
 
 How can SASSA‟s CEO improve the existing internal controls relating to possible tax 
evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes? 
 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objective of this study was to propose improvements to the existing internal controls 
designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA for minimising possible tax evasion within 
SASSA‟s SCM processes   
 
The sub-objectives were as follows: 
 
 To review current literature on tax evasion in public procurement and existing strategies 
designed for minimising such evasion. 
 
 To explore participants‟ views of the effectiveness and implementation of internal 
controls designed for minimising possible tax evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes. 
 
 To improve the existing internal controls in order to minimise possible tax evasion within 
SASSA‟s SCM processes 
 
1.5.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study was done in the form of a qualitative research and had a holistic case-study design, 
with the case in hand being SASSA. Multiple data sources, namely public documentation and 
interviews with participants, were used. Two phases were followed to collect and analyse data: 
in phase one, SASSA documents relevant to the study were selected and analysed, and in 
   
 
phase two, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with SASSA members of 
staff. 
 
1.6. DELINEATION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The fact that this study focused on SASSA‟s internal controls specifically designed for 
minimising the risk of possible tax evasion being committed by EMEs contracting with the 
entity was to the advantage of the researcher in that as a SASSA employee it was easier for 
him to access data for the study, there were no travel expenses whatsoever, and no other 
practical constraints were experienced during the investigation.  
 
The researcher obtained and analysed only data relating to SASSA‟s internal controls 
designed for EMEs for minimising possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption within the SCM 
department, and only SASSA members of staff involved in the SCM processes were 
interviewed.  
 
SASSA members of staff from other branches, for instance Corporate Services, Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT), Grants Operations, Policy Implementation Support and 
Strategy and Business Development (SASSA2016a    , and all members of staff from the 
SASSA regional offices were not interviewed due to limited funds for travelling.  
 
It was also impossible to collect data from other national public entities, because that would 
have been too time-consuming and the costs involved would have been exorbitant.  
 
The study did not include the contract between SASSA and the CPS, but focused only on the 
internal controls designed for EMEs in general for minimising possible tax evasion, and not for 
a particular company or EME. 
 
1.7. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION 
 
The underlying assumption of this study was that the ineffectiveness and inconsistent 
implementation of the internal controls designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA result in 
possible tax evasion, which in turn could eventually result in a loss to the fiscus. Risk factors 
that generally contribute to possible tax evasion within the SCM processes could include the 
following: 
 
   
 
 An increasing trend of fraud and corruption cases at SASSA, indicating that corruption 
activities such as collusions and kickbacks are prevalent. 
 People in the business of defrauding SASSA SCM register companies on a daily basis, 
because a newly-registered company automatically has a good-standing tax-compliance 
status. In this process there is a change in company number and name, but not in 
directors. 
 EMEs either submit fraudulent tax-clearance certificates to SASSA or file a zero return at 
SARS in order to get a good-standing tax-compliance status that will enable them to 
secure a contract with SASSA.  
 The CSD will never detect whether an EME submitted a true return to SARS reflecting 
the correct income received for a particular year in order to get a good-standing tax-
compliance status - SARS‟s system merely confirms the tax status of an EME. 
 An increasing trend of irregular expenditure at SASSA, indicating that SCM policies and 
processes are deliberately ignored - for example an EME colluding with a SASSA SCM 
practitioner and not submitting a tax-clearance certificate. 
 
1.8. SIGNIFICANCE (OR RATIONALE) OF THE STUDY 
 
This study makes both a theoretical and a practical contribution to the knowledge base. 
Theoretically speaking, although research has been done on tax evasion in various 
environments, research on the internal controls implemented by SASSA for minimising the risk 
of possible tax evasion has been minimal. This is why this study provides a substantial 
explanation of how the weaknesses and inconsistent implementation of SASSA‟s SCM 
internal controls designed for EMEs could result in possible fraud, corruption and tax evasion. 
 
In the past two decades, government made more effort to ensure that every citizen has his or 
her share in terms of contributing to the collection of revenue in this country. Some of these 
efforts have proved to work, and some not. This study therefore investigated the best strategy 
for SASSA for minimising the risk of possible tax evasion within its SCM internal controls 
designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA.  
 
The practical implication of this study will therefore be that SASSA will have improved 
methods for dealing with possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption and will indirectly 
contribute to the improvement of guidelines provided by the National Treasury. The strategy 
could also be of benefit to other government departments and entities, for instance SARS and 
the CIPC. 
   
 
 
1.9. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 1 deals with what the study was set to achieve, why this particular study was chosen 
and how the study would be conducted. It defines the limitations of the study, and the 
academic value and practical relevance of conducting this research. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with literature published by other scholars on tax evasion and public 
procurement in general, under the following headings: 
 
- the relationship between taxation/revenue and government expenditure  
- the risk factors that generally contribute to possible tax evasion   
- tax evasion, existing strategies and challenges of implementing the strategies by SARS 
- existing internal controls implemented at SASSA for minimising possible fraud, corruption 
and tax evasion  
- proposed solutions and strategies for minimising possible tax evasion 
 
Chapter 3 provides details of the research method chosen for carrying out this research, 
explains how the population sample was acquired and how the data were analysed, followed 
by the verification of trustworthiness, limitations and ethical considerations.  
 
Chapter 4 presents and analyses the data gathered from SASSA for exploring the 
effectiveness and consistent implementation of SASSA‟s internal controls developed for EMEs 
contracting with the agency in order to minimise possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption, 
using the explanation-building analysis technique. 
 
Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks and gives a brief summary of the findings. 
Recommendations are made for reducing possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption in 
SASSA‟s SCM processes, and possible future research is suggested.  
 
1.10. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 
This chapter provided a brief background to SASSA‟s SCM policies, processes and 
procedures and to how EMEs came into being. The link between existing internal controls and 
the risk of possible tax evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes was also discussed, as were 
the research methodology (including the research question, objectives and method), 
   
 
delimitations, significance of the study and underlying assumptions. The structure of the study 
was discussed to illustrate how the stated research objective would be achieved.   
 
In the next chapter, the general risk factors contributing to possible tax evasion and the 
existing strategies to curb them will be discussed in conjunction with public procurement in 
general.   
 
 
  
   
 
CHAPTER 2:  GENERAL RISK FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POSSIBLE 
TAX EVASION WITHIN SCM AND EXISTING STRATEGIES FOR CURBING 
THOSE FACTORS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, various literary sources are discussed in order to investigate the following: how 
tax relates to government expenditure spent through the procuring of goods and services from 
the private sector, risk factors contributing to possible tax evasion within the public-
procurement processes, causes and  consequences of these factors, and existing strategies 
and internal controls implemented by SARS, the National Treasury and SASSA, in 
collaboration, in order to deal with possible tax evasion.  
 
This review will specifically examine the following: 
 
 the relationship between taxation and government expenditure (sect      
 risk factors generally contributing to possible tax evasion (sect    ) 
 tax evasion, existing strategies and challenges (sect    ) 
 internal controls currently in place in SASSA‟s SCM department (sect    ) 
 proposed solutions and strategies for minimising possible tax evasion (sect    ) 
 
2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXATION/REVENUE AND GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE 
 
The primary objective of taxation in the South African tax system is to fund government 
expenditure (SARS          All South African individuals, companies and trusts are expected 
to declare all their income in their income-tax return and pay their fair share of tax in 
accordance with the tax policies and legislation, enabling government to deliver services to the 
vast majority of poor people in South Africa (George 2012:13). All procurement activities are 
funded from the revenue collected from taxpayers (Neu, Everett & Rahaman           
 
Collecting revenue and management of expenditure form part of the South African fiscal policy 
(National Treasury     a:29), and this policy is controlled by the National Treasury as a 
tool for managing the spending levels of government departments and entities. The revenue 
collected is to pay for the spending (National Treasury     a). 
   
 
  
The fiscal policy is intended to achieve micro-economic goals such as (National Treasury 
    a)  
 
 maintenance of full-time employment  
 a high rate of economic growth  
 price stability  
 a stable exchange rate for the domestic currency  
 
If there is no revenue collection, government will not be able to pay for its expenses, and the 
goals of the fiscal policy will not be attained. However, before government can do any 
spending, some planning has to be done. The budgeting process is a critical factor in planning 
and in the allocation of available resources with which to support the service-delivery plans of 
government departments and entities, and forms part of the fiscal policy (National Treasury 
    d      
 
Government‟s budgeting process begins with the preparation of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) document (National Treasury     d   , during which process 
all government departments and entities, including SASSA, submit their medium-term 
strategic plans and the costing of those plans at that particular time in the financial year, 
enabling the National Treasury to accordingly allocate funds for the coming financial year 
(National Treasury     b   . When the budget cycle is complete, the minister of finance tables 
the budget in Parliament, whereafter the spending ensues. 
 
Public procurement is governments‟ key economic activity that has a major impact on how 
taxpayers‟ money is spent (De la Muette 2007:5). According to Haron, Mohamed, Omar and 
Jomitin (2013:200) “public procurement” is the process of acquiring goods and services by the 
public sector from external parties. Government therefore relies on the private sector for the 
procurement of goods and services. In this study, the terms “public procurement” and 
“government procurement” are used interchangeably.  
 
Each department or entity is then expected to develop its own procurement policies and 
procedures in line with the procurement framework and legislation developed by the South 
African government for spending the funds allocated to them by the National Treasury, and in 
return the suppliers appointed to provide goods or services are expected to comply with all tax 
policies and legislation (National Treasury 2001; National Treasury 2016c). 
   
 
 
SARS is responsible for making sure that taxes are paid according to the law, and taxpayers 
abide by the rules and contribute the correct amount of tax, as do those companies providing 
the goods or services (SARS     ). The main obstacle as far as revenue collection in South 
Africa, and in the world, is concerned, is tax evasion. Below follows a discussion of the day-to-
day risk factors contributing to possible tax evasion. 
 
2.3 RISK FACTORS THAT GENERALLY CONTRIBUTE TO POSSIBLE TAX EVASION 
 
Sorunke, Omojola and Adeleke (          state the following: 
 
Public procurement has always played a major role in the world‟s economic activities  
Studies around the world have also shown that government procurement of goods and 
services accounted for between 15-25 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
developed countries and that could be more for developing countries. 
 
However, there are certain risk factors that generally contribute to possible tax evasion in 
public procurement, including the following: fraud and corruption, malicious tax compliance, 
and inconsistent implementation of internal controls. 
 
Below follows a discussion of each of these factors, their causes and consequences, and how 
each of them relates to possible tax evasion within the public-procurement processes.  
 
2.3.1 Fraud and corruption 
 
Corruption is a universal phenomenon: according to Grossi and Pianezzi (      ), neither 
democratic nor developing countries are free from the challenges of corruption , and according 
to Britz (2012), South Africa is one of the latter countries struggling with the impact and 
consequences of corruption. 
 
2.3.1.1 Defining corruption 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004a defines corruption as 
follows: 
 
Any person who, directly or indirectly- 
   
 
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person. 
Whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of another person: or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification.  
for the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another person. 
in order to act. Personally or by influencing another person so to act. In a manner-  
(i) that amounts to the- 
(aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete or biased: or 
(bb) misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course 
of the exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions 
arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation: 
(ii) that amounts to-  
(aa) the abuse of a position of authority: 
(bb) a breach of trust; or 
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules: 
(iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result: or 
(iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything, 
is guilty of the offence of corruption 
 
2.3.1.2 Defining fraud 
 
According to Fowler, Fowler and Thompson (     , the Concise Oxford dictionary defines 
fraud as “criminal deception, the use of false representations to an unjust advantage and a 
dishonest artifice or trick”, and Coenen (2008:86) describes procurement fraud as being 
“essentially the manipulation of the process of obtaining a contract for goods or services”  
Fraud and corruption in public procurements are treated in the same way. Below follows a 
discussion of the relationship between fraud and corruption and tax evasion. 
 
  
   
 
2.3.1.3 Relationship between “fraud and corruption” and tax evasion 
 
According to Swanepoel (     , “fraud”, “corruption” and “tax evasion” are economic crimes 
that  
 
seem to have become part of the daily lives of people in the public and private sector 
and the South African media, including television, radio and various newspapers have 
confirmed the existence of economic crimes. 
 
There has been found to be a relationship between “fraud and corruption” and tax evasion  In 
this connection, Swanepoel (2013) states that 
 
... economic crime (such as fraud and corruption) has an impact on taxation in 
South Africa, that economic crime offences ignore any possible taxation 
consequences and that the type of the economic crime being perpetrated is a 
function of the opportunities available to a potential offender. 
 
Arnaldo (2014:22) concurs with Swanepoel that tax evasion is related to fraud by defining the 
latter as a voluntary act undertaken with a view to eliminating or reducing tax by omission, 
forgery, alteration, misrepresentation or concealment of information to SARS.  
 
Corruption, through certain elements in the definition contained in the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (ie that it is an illegal, dishonest, or unauthorised 
action or an abuse of authority, a breach of trust, or a violation of a legal duty), is also related 
to tax evasion. 
 
The element most common to fraud, tax evasion and corruption is “dishonesty”. According to 
Fowler et al (    ), the Concise Oxford dictionary of current English describes “dishonesty” as 
a lack of honesty, deceitfulness, fraud, a dishonest or fraudulent act, from which it follows that 
tax evasion is related to both “fraud and corruption”  
 
In the discussion that follows, the word “corruption” is used in the same context as “fraud”, 
because of the word “dishonesty” being used in the definition of tax evasion as well as in the 
definitions of fraud and corruption respectively. Therefore, when a taxpayer evades tax or 
fraudulently reduces his or her tax liability or gives an official a bribe in order to bypass certain 
   
 
SCM processes, he or she is deemed to have been dishonest. According to SASSA 
(    c    , SASSA may therefore institute criminal charges against such a taxpayer. 
 
According to SASSA‟s fraud-prevention strategy SASSA (    c  ), the term “fraud” refers 
collectively to all criminal and dishonest acts such as corruption, theft, embezzlement, forgery 
and utterings that may result in a financial or other prejudice to SASSA. The above analysis 
indicates that fraud and corruption committed against SASSA could be detrimental to the 
collection of revenue by SARS and could ultimately result in a loss to the fiscus. 
 
A clear example of fraud and corruption is where an EME makes a material false statement by 
for instance submitting an invalid tax-clearance certificate or an invalid BEE certificate whilst 
knowing that the certificate was fraudulent and that SASSA relied on the fraudulent certificate 
when awarding a contract.  
 
The EME concerned is then guilty of fraud and if a SASSA employee was involved in the 
transaction and received kickbacks, ignoring the SCM compliance processes in favour of the 
EME, that employee is guilty of corruption, meaning that a fraud and corruption transaction 
occurred (SASSA 2015c). 
 
2.3.1.4 Main activities of fraud and corruption in procurement processes 
 
In his interview with City Press, the chief procurement officer (CPO) indicated that the biggest 
sources of corruption and waste are not the tenders amounting to R50 million seen in the 
news, but the millions of small routeing transactions that happen every day and make up 97% 
of all transactions – a million small opportunities for vast corruption (Van Rensburg 2015:9-     
 
The majority of these small transactions take place when government departments and 
entities, including SASSA, enter into a contract with EMEs in order to procure goods and 
services. According to Burguet, Ganuza and Garcia Montalvo (2016:8), De Lange (2013    , 
and the SAIPA Tax Committee (2012), the following are the main activities of procurement 
fraud and corruption:  
 
 Collusion between employees and suppliers – this may involve internal staff accepting 
bribes or kickbacks from suppliers for bending the SCM rules.  
 Unjustified single-source awards – an internal staff member of an organisation may invite 
only one quotation from one supplier without justifiable reasons.   
   
 
 Creation of a number of companies in order to evade tax – compliance with tax policies 
and legislation is one of the requirements before a bidder can be awarded a tender. If the 
supplier cannot get a tax-compliance status, it may register new companies and use 
them for tendering, with the intention of deceiving SASSA. SARS will then also be 
deceived, because the revenue that should have been declared to SARS will never be 
declared because of a new company having been registered by the same directors of the 
old company.  
 Concealment and misrepresentation of material facts – this may include the submission 
of fraudulent documents. 
 Deliberate non-compliance with SCM legislation, policies and regulations. 
 
2.3.1.5 Causes of corruption in public procurement 
 
According to Sikka and Lehman (       ), corruption is rife in South African government 
procurement processes. The reasons for this are as follows: 
 
 Media images of corrupt politicians and government employees getting away with severe 
infringement of the law on a regular basis encourage individuals within the procurement 
process to do the same when the opportunity arises (Fischer, Ferreira, Milfont & Pilati 
          . 
 
 Inadequate policies and procedures, insufficient supervision, complex legislation, a lack 
of ethical awareness, and deficient internal controls and accountability perpetrated 
corruption in the procurement processes (Webb 2009b     
 
 The large amounts of money involved in public procurement create a vulnerable 
environment for corruption (Haron et al          . 
 
 The high number of bribes in public procurement disturbs the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the procurement policies and processes, resulting in a huge wastage of 
public funds (Haron et al          . 
 
 The high volumes of goods and services acquired from the private sector by 
governments make government procurement departments the most fertile ground for 
corruption (Neu et al         ,  
 
   
 
 There is a great deal of greediness among both suppliers to and internal staff in 
government procurement departments (Akomah & Nani 2016:82). 
 
 Weaknesses in institutional structures and failure to implement and enforce policies and 
laws are the most important causes of corruption in public procurement (Akomah & Nani 
        . 
 
 Dissatisfaction with the fiscal system and the widespread perception of a misuse of the 
revenue collected demoralise citizens to comply with the laws of the country (Pinto, 
Lisboa & Batista 2013:83). 
 
Next, the consequences of fraud and corruption are discussed. 
 
2.3.1.6 Consequences of fraud and corruption 
 
Fraud and corruption could have serious consequences (Britz 2012), particularly in the 
procurement processes, if not prevented or detected in advance. Some of the consequences 
are as follows: 
 
(a) Loss to the fiscus due to tax evasion and tax non-compliance 
 
According to the Institute of Internal Auditors (Sowetan      , South Africa lost R700 billion 
because of corruption over the last 20 years, which, according to Munzhedzi (       , was 
attributed to fraud and corruption in public procurement. 
 
Since all government procurement activities are funded from revenue collected from 
taxpayers, (Neu et al         , it is a challenge to recover monies stolen through fraud and 
corruption in public procurement (Business Day         
 
Corruption Watch, in its 2014 annual report (Corruption Watch 2014:18) states the following: 
 
Procurement processes are particularly vulnerable to corruption and the phenomenon 
pertains to both the selection of suppliers, where procedures are flouted and tenders 
are allocated to family and friends of government officials, and the over-payment of 
suppliers so that government officials, by colluding with suppliers, can embezzle funds.  
   
 
 
Tax evasion 
 
According to Hessami (    ), corruption hampers the collection of more revenue, and 
according to Cordos (2010:221), tax evasion directly affects the levels of tax revenue and the 
income of the state, and ultimately every citizen in the country. 
 
Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and McClellan (2016:146) agree that “corruption and tax evasion are 
distinct and separate problems, but they can easily become intertwined and reinforcing”. A 
society that is more corrupt may enable more tax evasion, as corrupt officials seek more 
income via bribes, and conversely, higher levels of tax evasion may drive corruption by 
offering more opportunities for bribes (Alm et al         
 
If this trend of corruption continues, it will hamper government‟s commitment to reduce the 
estimated budget deficit, which is 4.3% of the GDP, through other measures (Lamprecht 
2017), but increasing taxes to cover for the deficit could exacerbate the practices of tax 
evasion.  
 
The current trend of corruption needs to be stopped -- otherwise the whole economy may 
collapse. There is therefore a need to tighten the internal controls to prevent this phenomenon 
continually eroding our economy.  
 
Tax non-compliance 
 
Corruption is a constant global phenomenon that is becoming more complex and intense as 
competition for resources increases (Serfontein & De Waal 2015:1). It is even more so among 
those living in developing countries, particularly emerging economies such as South Africa 
(Serfontein & De Waal 2015). 
 
High levels of corruption decrease compliance levels that eventually end up in tax evasion, 
which also makes non-compliance one of the common factors that contribute to tax evasion 
(Escobari 2012:317). SARS‟s own internal indicators of compliance by small businesses show 
high levels of non-compliance across the entire compliance value chain (SARS 2014b:      
 
According to Lipatov (         , “the phenomenon of tax non-compliance is pervasive 
through-out the world and may have unpleasant consequences for the economy”   
   
 
 
(b) Weakening of the internal controls 
 
Corruption weakens the internal controls. Sikka and Lehman (         argue that “good 
internal controls in government departments, though highly desirable, are unlikely to make a 
significant dent in corrupt practices to secure government contracts”  Even when proper 
internal controls are in place, no one is willing to comply with them or review them in order to 
respond to the high level of corruption because of bribery and kickbacks received from the 
corruptors. 
  
(c) Integrity  
 
Corruption compromises the integrity of civil servants in the SCM sections within government 
departments and entities, causing them to refuse their regular duties in anticipation of 
kickbacks from members of the public (Islam & Ananya 2015     
 
2.3.2 Malicious tax compliance  
 
According to SARS, deliberate non-compliance with tax policies and legislation is always 
associated with tax evasion (SARS 2015:21). SARS‟s own internal indicators of compliance by 
small businesses, including EMEs, show high levels of non-compliance across the entire 
compliance value chain (SARS 2014b).  
 
In South Africa, when government acquires goods and services, preference in public 
procurement is given to EMEs, in order to address past discriminatory practices and policies 
by empowering the previously-disadvantaged small-business majority (Munzhedzi 2016). 
 
EMEs in South Africa represent a high-risk group identified by SARS for non-compliance, 
because of the following reasons (SARS 2013a      
 
 There are many of them. 
 Their income is often neither fixed nor, in most cases, capable of easy verification 
against third-party data.  
 Their commercial set-ups can lack the well-developed structures for record- keeping, 
independent auditing of accounts and cash-handling that help minimise risks of under-
reporting. 
   
 
 
According to the Davis Tax Committee (2014:11), in the 2011 year of assessment, 434 674 
EMEs reported a taxable income of Rnil, this number including the EMEs that reported a loss. 
The Committee also concluded that SARS should be worried about the possibilities that the 
EMEs (in this case small businesses) could have either  
 
 falsified the tax returns, or  
 cooked the books and accounts, or 
 disguised certain transactions, or  
 deliberately not disclosed their income in a full and honest manner, or  
 deliberately overstated deductible expenditure 
 
Fagariba (2016:116) concurs with the Davis Tax Committee that EMEs deliberately refuse to 
honour their tax obligations by distorting relevant information relating to an assessment with 
the intention of reducing the liability of which may be tantamount to malicious compliance.  
 
SARS blames the growing public perception of government inefficiency and corruption for 
deliberate tax non-compliance (SARS 2015:21), while Rosid, Evans and Tran-Nam (2016:2) 
concur that high levels of perceptions of corruption undermine taxpayers‟ intention to report 
their actual income. 
 
The analysis indicates that malicious tax compliance is the result of high corruption levels and 
could result in a loss in revenue collection.  
 
2.3.3 Inconsistent implementation of internal controls  
 
Swanepoel (2013:4) argues that economic crimes (fraud, corruption and tax evasion) continue 
to occur despite the many deterrence measures in place. This could mean that it is impossible 
to reduce tax evasion to a level of zero, and that the only strategy for managing tax evasion is 
to review the  risks on a regular basis and to develop proper internal controls for mitigating 
these risks (Sweidan in Jackson 2015:10).  
 
But to have proper internal controls and to implement them are two different things. Fourie and 
Ackermann (2013:493) therefore suggest that if the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations‟ 
Integrated Framework for Internal Control (the COSO framework) were to be used as a 
   
 
recognised framework and were to be implemented accordingly, it could result in an effective 
internal-control system.  
 
Government departments and entities find it very difficult to implement internal controls, even 
though some of them have adopted the COSO framework. In South Africa, government 
departments and entities and reports on compliance with key legislation applicable to financial 
matters, including supply-chain management (SCM), are audited by the auditor general on an 
annual basis (Auditor General 2014:57). 
 
However, in the auditor general‟s report referred to above, non-compliance with the SCM 
regulations is identified as one of the areas with the most non-compliance, all because of the 
inconsistent implementation of internal controls within the departments and public entities. 
 
Non-compliance with the SCM policies and regulations is evident in the growing patterns of 
“irregular expenditure” in government as a whole -- “irregular expenditure” being identified by 
the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 as expenditure incurred in contravention of, or 
not in accordance with, a requirement of any applicable legislation.  
 
De Lange (         confirms the relationship between internal controls and “irregular 
expenditure” by stating that the latter relates almost exclusively to non-compliance with 
various SCM regulations. De Lange (2013) then gives examples normally relating to non-
compliance, such as the necessary tender documentation, namely a tax-clearance certificate 
or a BEE certificate not being submitted. Although SASSA requires a number of tender 
documents before awarding a contract, for the purpose of this study the focus will be on the 
aforementioned certificates. 
 
Non-compliance with the SCM regulations is a challenge facing all departments and entities 
across the country and may result in the contravention of other legislation, for example, 
section 25 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011, which deals with the submission of 
returns, because non-submission of  returns may ultimately result in tax evasion.  
 
As indicated by the analysis of this risk factor, corruption is still common as far as compliance 
with SCM legislation, policies and procedures is concerned, and could result in tax evasion. 
 
 
   
 
2.4 TAX EVASION, EXISTING STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES  
 
According to Stankevicius and Leonas (        ), “tax evasion is an important social-
economic problem in all societies of the world, regardless of the type of tax system or the 
country's economic development level”, and according to Steenkamp (2012:228), tax evasion 
is usually characterised by fraud and deceit. It refers to all illegal activities deliberately 
undertaken by a taxpayer to free him- or herself from any tax burden. Examples here include 
the falsification of returns and the conclusion of sham transactions. Tax avoidance, on the 
other hand, is characterised by open and full disclosure, where a taxpayer has arranged his or 
her affairs in a perfectly legal manner so that he or she has either reduced his or her income 
or has no taxable income. 
 
Steenkamp (2012) further argues that because of the thin line between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance, the two concepts may be confused with each other.  
 
The courts have played an important role in clarifying the distinction between tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. In the English case of Duke of Westminster v IRC, for example, Lord Tomlin 
made the following well-known statement about tax avoidance: 
 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them 
so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be 
compelled to pay an increased tax. 
 
Other cases followed the above-mentioned one, and the courts also endorsed the view that a 
taxpayer is entitled to arrange his or her affairs so as to pay the least amount of tax. Examples 
of such cases are as follows: Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler and others, 
Commissioner of Taxes v Ferera, Inland Revenue Commissioner v Burmah Oil Co Ltd, 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd, Michau v Maize Board and 
Commissioner for SARS v NWK Ltd.  
 
However, any attempts promoting “dishonesty” have always been challenged by SARS, and in 
many instances proved to be cases of tax evasion.  
 
In the English case of IR v Challenge Corporation Ltd, Lord Templeman said the following: 
 
   
 
Evasion occurs when the Commissioner is not informed of all the facts relevant to 
an assessment of tax. Innocent evasion may lead to a reassessment. Fraudulent 
evasion may lead to a criminal prosecution as well as reassessment. 
 
Arnaldo (2014), states that a clear example of tax evasion is when a taxpayer withholds 
information from, or provides false declarations to, the tax authority.  
 
According to the National Treasury (2016c:3), EMEs contracting with government are required 
by public procurement policies and legislation to capture their information as true and correct 
on the central supplier database (CSD) system before they can be considered to be 
prospective providers of goods and services to government (National Treasury 2016c:3). If the 
information captured is based on a falsified tax-clearance certificate obtained by declaring a 
false income on the income-tax return, it will be tantamount to tax evasion. 
 
Governments worldwide have turned their attention to the idea of systemic tax reforms, 
targeted to curtail tax evasion and avoidance evident among the relevant groups of taxpayers, 
with the main objective of controlling the expansion of their tax gaps (Morgan-Thomas 
          
 
Current strategies 
 
According to SA ePublication (2012:11), SARS (2005), Steenkamp (2012:249) and Swanepoel 
(2013:44), in the past decade or so SARS implemented the following strategies for dealing 
with tax evasion. 
 
 administrative and understatement penalties 
 occasional audits 
 reportable arrangements 
 voluntary-disclosure programme 
 awareness resources 
 
When implementing the above strategies for improving compliance, combating tax evasion 
and increasing revenue, SARS faces a number of challenges, as discussed below. 
 
Challenges when implementing the current strategies for possible tax-evasion 
 
   
 
Below are some of the common challenges facing SARS on a day-to-day basis (Bergman in 
Murillo 2011:144; Erasmus 2007; Khaki 2012:7; Krause 2014:10; Kriel 2013:7,8; Lombard 
      ,   Surtees & Ross 2014:25): 
 
 As yet there is no proof that administrative penalties and audits are effective. 
 The new anti-avoidance provisions of the Tax Administration Act, 2011, are burdensome. 
 A default position taken by SARS about additional assessment causes taxpayers to 
always challenge SARS‟s decisions  
 SARS‟s lack of consistency in levying penalties and additional assessment creates an 
environment for some taxpayers to challenge SARS on the grounds of unfair treatment. 
 The fact that SARS does not give taxpayers any reasons for understatement penalties 
has a demoralising effect on taxpayers with regard to coming forward. 
 If a taxpayer is found to have evaded tax, it is difficult for SARS to prove the taxpayer‟s 
“intention”  
 To get to the stage where a taxpayer faces criminal charges may be a cumbersome 
process. 
 
The above-mentioned challenges have made it very difficult for SARS to deal with the issues 
of tax evasion. SARS ends up losing cases in court, resulting in losing money meant for the 
fiscus. The view is therefore that robust intervention is needed.  
 
In its 2015/16 strategic plan, SARS proposed to shift from a gate- keeping to a risk-
management approach in order for it to focus on where its scarce resources will have the 
largest impact on non-compliance. Adopting a risk-management approach also gives SARS 
an opportunity to tailor taxpayers‟ experiences in terms of their interactions with SARS on the 
basis of their assessed risks (SARS           
 
This study considers workable strategies for minimising the possible risk of tax evasion within 
the SASSA SCM processes in order to help SARS fulfil its objective of collecting more 
revenue from all the eligible taxpayers in the country. 
 
Below follows a discussion of current strategies in place for minimising possible tax evasion 
within the government SCM processes. 
 
   
 
2.5 EXISTING INTERNAL CONTROLS WITHIN SASSA’S SCM DEPARTMENT  
 
South Africa has an indefinable state procurement system, created in 2004 with the 
decentralisation of tendering from the monolithic former national tender board to 660 
government entities (including national and provincial departments, municipalities, state-
owned companies, as well as SASSA) that put out tenders (Van Rensburg 2015:3). 
 
SCM regulations for public-sector procurement of goods and services, in many instances 
introduced during the last two decades, greatly contributed to improved transparency of 
procurement procedures, increased opportunities for alternative suppliers and reduced 
opportunities for corrupt procurement practices. There is however evidence that these 
regulations are often not implemented to the best effect (Wall, Watermeyer & Pirie 2013:44). 
 
At the beginning of 2015, the National Treasury published an accumulation of work done by 
the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) since its establishment in 2013. The work 
included a first overall review of the tender system in 10 years (Van Rensburg 2015), reflecting 
the views of government, business and civil society. It showed a growing appreciation of the 
fact that SCM reform would require collaboration and should be treated as a national project 
(National Treasury 2015a:1). 
 
SASSA, in collaboration with the National Treasury and SARS, has developed strategies for 
mitigating the risks in the SCM processes that could lead to possible corruption, fraud and tax 
evasion. Each department has its mandate to fulfil in this regard, as discussed below. 
 
The National Treasury developed a number of legal instruments for governing the SCM 
processes. such as (National Treasury 2015a:10): 
 
 the Public Finance Management Act,      
 National Treasury regulations 
 the Implementation guide: preferential procurement regulations 
 a practice note on the restriction of suppliers 
 the SCM guide for accounting officers 
 
The above legal instruments were developed for governing the SCM processes in all 
government departments and entities.  
 
   
 
Traditionally, the National Treasury depends on SARS for developing strategies for minimising 
tax evasion  In other instances, as part of SARS‟s strategies, SARS delegated its powers to 
companies, including banks, financial institutions, co-corporatives, etc, to help collect revenue, 
such as revenue resulting from interest, dividends and capital gains/losses on its behalf.. All 
institutions entrusted with the administration of the aforementioned are required to submit an 
IT3 form to SARS disclosing the amount of money accrued to the taxpayer (South Africa 
        
 
SASSA is one of the government entities that developed internal controls for minimising 
possible tax evasion in the SCM processes, in line with the above-mentioned instruments 
provided by the National Treasury. 
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) suggests 
that any effective internal-control system in any organisation should have the following 
characteristics (Fourie & Ackermann 2013):  
 
  Control environment – The executive‟s attitude to making internal controls effective is 
critical. The executive should namely take internal controls seriously and not change 
controls as and when they wish. If the executive is seen not to be interested in enforcing 
the internal controls in place, the entire organisation will move towards the direction 
favoured by the top executives, meaning that such an organisation may have proper and 
sound internal controls, but either these controls will never be implemented, or only some 
will be implemented. 
  Risk assessment –An organisation should regularly assess what could go wrong in the 
organisation so that a strategy can be developed far in advance, before something 
distressing happens in that organisation. 
  Information and communication – Effective information and communication would require 
an organisation to have good and sound business systems that would help the 
organisation to gather credible information related to internal control, and management 
who uses this information for supporting employees in doing their work. 
  Monitoring activities – Effective monitoring requires an organisation to perform on-going 
testing of existing control activities and procedures for identifying weaknesses and 
determining mechanisms to follow when business processes change. 
 Control activities – It is critical that organisations develop specific activities to be 
performed by its personnel to ensure that internal controls are effective. 
 
   
 
The section that follows discusses key internal controls in SASSA‟ SCM, that is, internal 
controls designed to ensure compliance with SCM policies and legislation (sect 2.5.1), internal 
controls designed for tax compliance (sect 2.5.2) and internal controls designed for preventing 
fraud and corruption activities (sect 2.5.3). 
 
2.5.1 Internal controls for ensuring compliance with SCM policies and legislation 
 
Non-compliance with the procurement processes and procedures constitutes one of the most 
serious infringements of the procurement rules (Sigma 2013:4), because it could result in 
irregular expenditure, possible tax evasion and, eventually, loss to the fiscus.  
 
SASSA therefore introduced a number of internal controls for ensuring that SCM policies and 
regulations are complied with, including the following (SASSA 2015a:50); (SASSA 2015e:5-    
 
A compliance checklist (following the Public Finance Management Act,       
 
 A compliance checklist (following the Public Finance Management Act,      . 
 Delegation of authority. Promoting compliance and accountability. 
 Any unethical behaviour such as bribery and collusion between staff in the SCM 
department and SASSA as a whole on the one hand and EMEs on the other with a view 
to fraud and corruption is dealt with under the code of conduct that is in place. 
 SASSA‟s SCM policies and procedures for facilitating the procurement of goods and 
services have been brought in line with the guidelines and directives of the National 
Treasury. 
 SASSA‟s risk-management strategy provides reasonable assurance that the entity‟s risks 
are effectively managed and brings a culture of risk management to the enterprise. 
 
2.5.2 Internal controls designed for tax compliance 
 
The internal controls developed in the SCM for dealing with possible tax evasion have been 
fragmented.  
 
One of the prerequisites for EMEs to be able to contract with the state is compliance with tax 
legislation and policies (SASSA 2016b).  
 
   
 
However, SARS has been operating in isolation from SASSA, the CIPC and the National 
Treasury as far as tax-compliance-related activities is concerned (SARS           Although 
SARS has a direct relationship with the National Treasury regarding revenue-collection 
activities, it is the latter who has a direct relationship with SASSA regarding SCM policies and 
tax-compliance activities, and not SARS.  
 
It is the sole mandate of the Company and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) to register 
companies and assist departments and public entities, including SASSA, with the verification 
of the BEE status of EMEs before the latter can contract with the state for the delivery of 
goods or the rendering of services.  
 
SASSA is therefore dependent on the CIPC documents provided by EMEs to confirm their 
BEE status before contracting with any supplier. However, there has not been a central point 
where all the relevant government entities can do any cross-checking with a view to improve 
tax compliance within the SCM processes, so that SARS can maximise its revenue collection. 
 
In its 2014/15 strategic plan, SARS (2015:14) suggested to mitigate the risk of possible tax 
evasion through increased compliance activities across government departments and entities. 
 
In addition in a review published in 2015, the National Treasury identified a number of 
weaknesses, (among others, the greatest weakness more relevant to this study, namely data 
fragmentation), and stated that it found it very difficult to create inter-database correlations and 
verification with organisations such as SARS and the CIPC (National Treasury     a    . 
 
It was envisaged to launch a central supplier database (CSD) as a strategy for addressing the 
lack of inter-database correlations and verification. The purpose of the interface was to 
simplify the SCM processes and to enable the electronic validation of supplier tax compliance 
(National Treasury 2015a:65).  
 
The above led to the launching of a CSD on 1 April 2016 to simplify SCM processes and 
improve tax compliance (National Treasury 2016c     
 
With the new CSD process, at SASSA, EMEs are still required to manually submit tax-
clearance certificates to prove tax compliance with SARS legislation and policies, whereas at 
the National Treasury the verification is done electronically (National Treasury 2016c).  
 
   
 
2.5.3 Internal controls designed for preventing fraud and corruption activities 
 
Fraud and corruption normally result in direct or indirect tax evasion. According to Sorunke et 
al (2016), it is an acceptable practice in public procurement systems to establish measures for 
understanding and managing the risk of fraud and corruption, and according to Neu et al 
(        , the best way of reducing fraud and corruption is a combination of prevention and 
detection activities. 
 
Neu et al      view internal controls as ways of preventing and detecting corrupt and 
fraudulent procurement practices, and SASSA developed a fraud and corruption strategy, 
comprising the following internal controls (SASSA    ): 
 
 Fraud policy and response plan 
 The purpose of this policy is to reinforce SASSA‟s commitment to and responsibility for 
identifying risk exposures of “fraud and corruption” activities and for establishing policies, 
procedure and controls for detecting and preventing these activities (SASSA 2015b     
 
 Risk-management strategy 
This strategy outlines the process of how risk management should be conducted within 
SASSA to ensure that risks identified are assessed, ranked, prioritised and managed in 
an effective manner (SASSA     e     
 
 Fraud-prevention strategy 
This strategy outlines SASSA‟s detailed actions to be taken to prevent and detect fraud 
and corruption activities (SASSA     c       
 
 Fraud-prevention plan 
This plan outlines SASSA‟s detailed actions to be taken to prevent and detect fraud and 
corruption activities, and is reviewed annually to establish its effectiveness (SASSA 
    c       
 
 Whistle-blowing policy 
This policy helps to deter and detect wrongdoing in the workplace, acting as an early-
warning mechanism to prevent impropriety and corruption within the public sector 
(Department of Public Service        
 
   
 
 The whistle-blowing policy is intended to encourage SASSA employees to report fraud 
and corruption activities without fear or favour, so that no official should suffer any 
consequences for reporting an incident of fraud and corruption (SASSA 2015b      
 
 Code of conduct and ethics 
 The primary purpose of this code is to foster a culture of supreme integrity and 
organisational identity in both conduct and business ethics (SASSA 2008:8). 
 
 
 Disciplinary code 
This code contains all disciplinary proceedings and procedures for dealing with SASSA 
officials found to have committed fraud and corruption (SASSA 2015c      
 
 Integrity policy 
The purpose of this policy is to mitigate risks relating to damage to SASSA‟s image and 
any other threat that undermines service delivery (SASSA 2015d     
 
2.6 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR MINIMISING POSSIBLE TAX 
EVASION 
 
The challenge of eradicating tax evasion prompted SARS to propose a number of key 
strategic shifts for dealing with the contributory factors of possible tax evasion (SARS     ). 
  
The first strategic shift is moving from SARS‟s isolated departmental view of efficiency to a 
complete governmental view. Through this approach, SARS will be able to deal with issues of 
non-compliance with a broad range of stakeholders, including government departments and 
SASSA, to improve SARS‟s compliance efforts and increase revenue collection. 
 
The second strategic shift is moving from a gatekeeper to a risk-management approach. 
With this approach, SARS envisages to focus its efforts on where non-compliance has its 
biggest impact. 
 
The last strategic shift is moving from manual to automated/digital/self-service, which 
approach will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of managing taxpayers‟ compliance.  
 
The above strategies give a clear indication that SARS wishes other government institutions, 
including SASSA, to help deal with tax evasion, caused by non-compliance and corruption.  
   
 
 
According to Munzhedzi (     , corruption and government procurement are like inseparable 
twins. An analysis has shown that the biggest impact of non-compliance, resulting in possible 
tax evasion, occurs in cases where the services of EMEs are required for providing goods and 
services to government departments and entities (including SASSA). Internal controls are 
critical for making sure that economic crimes such as tax evasion, fraud and corruption 
committed in the SASSA SCM processes are detected and prevented.  
 
This study will therefore also address SARS‟s proposed strategic shifts by presenting a 
strategy that will integrate all the risks posing a threat to the collection of revenue from EMEs 
contracting with SASSA.  
 
2.7 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 
To give a better understanding of the chapters that follow, this chapter discussed important 
theory and concepts relating to possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption in public 
procurement.   
 
In the past two decades, there was no research on possible tax evasion in public procurement 
processes in South Africa. This study will therefore make a contribution to the theory on how 
to prevent possible tax evasion in the SCM processes. 
 
Inconsistent implementations of internal controls, fraud and corruption and malicious 
compliance with tax legislation were all identified as dominant factors in the SCM processes 
that contribute to possible tax evasion. From the definitions of corruption (see sect         
above) and fraud (see sect         above), it should be noted that tax evasion and “fraud and 
corruption” have a common element, namely “dishonesty”, leading to tax evasion, causing the 
South African government to lose billions of rand. 
 
It has been argued that it is impossible to bring down fraud, corruption and tax evasion in the 
public procurement processes to a level of zero - the only way to manage fraud, corruption 
and tax evasion being to review the risks of possible fraud, corruption and tax evasion on a 
regular basis and to develop proper internal controls and a strategy for mitigating those risks. 
Most importantly, controls should be developed for monitoring the implementation of the risk-
management strategy. 
 
   
 
This study seeks to propose improvements to the existing internal controls designed for EMEs 
contracting with SASSA in order to minimise possible tax evasion in SASSA‟s SCM 
processes.  
 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology used for exploring the views of SASSA 
employees who participated in the research on the implementation, effectiveness and 
consistent application of internal controls regarding the prevention and detection of possible 
fraud, corruption and tax evasion, in conjunction with the literature presented above. 
 
 
  
   
 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This study was done in the form of a qualitative research, using a case study as an exploratory 
technique. The main research question of this study was as follows: How effective are 
SASSA‟s internal controls designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA for minimising possible 
fraud, corruption and tax evasion in SASSA‟s SCM processes? This chapter describes the 
research design and the method that was followed to answer this question, and why the 
method was an appropriate choice.  
 
This chapter covers the following aspects: the paradigm of the study (sect 3.2); the research 
design (sect 3.3); the research method (sect 3.4), including the data-collection technique (sect 
      , population and sampling (sect 3.4.2), the data analysis (sect 3.4.3), and the verification 
of trustworthiness (sect 3.4.4); the limitations (sect 3.5); and ethical consideration (sect    ). 
The above is summarised in figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: Summary of the research methodology 
 
Summary of the research methodology 
Approach Qualitative approach Qualitative research studies the phenomenon 
within the social and cultural context in which it 
occurs (Salkind 2014:75). 
Paradigm Interpretive The study relied solely on the participants’ view 
of the situation and on the documents 
reviewed (see sect 3.2 below). 
Design Case-study design 
 
 
The case-study design used in this study had 
the following advantages:  
 
 It is a simple design. 
 It is about SASSA, the researcher’s place of 
employment. 
 
The researcher followed Yin’s approach (see 
sect 3.3 below).  
Method 
 Data collection 
 
 
 
 
 Population and 
sampling 
 
 
 
 Data analysis 
 
 
 
Data were collected by way of 
 documents 
 semi-structured interviews 
 
 population: 6 SASSA  policy 
documents  
 sampling: 7 SASSA staff 
members 
 
Data were analysed by using a     
 thematic analysis 
 
 
Using multiple sources of information in a case-
study design has the advantage that the 
findings and conclusions are likely to be more 
convincing.  
 
A convenient purposive sampling process,  
much less complicated and less expensive than 
other methods, was used. 
 
The specific Braun and Clarke method of 
thematic analysis was used. 
 
It was ensured that the procedures used for 
   
 
Summary of the research methodology 
 Verification of 
trustworthiness 
  Trustworthiness was verified on the 
basis of 
 credibility, and 
 transferability 
generating the findings complied with the 
principle of trustworthiness (see sect 3.4 
below). 
Limitations The study was limited to the 
following: 
 SASSA’s SCM internal 
controls 
 Staff members of SASSA’s 
head office 
Because of funding and time constraints 
SASSA’s regional offices and other government 
departments and entities could not be included 
in the study. 
Ethical consideration 
 
 
Participants were protected by 
withholding their identity. 
The study was pre-approved by SASSA’s CEO. 
The study was given ethical clearance by Unisa.  
(See appendix F and appendix G.) 
(Fig 2: Compiled by the researcher for summarising the research methodology.)  
 
3.2. PARADIGM 
This study was based on the interpretivism paradigm, also known as social constructivism, 
where people seek to understand the world they live and work in by developing subjective 
meanings of their experiences (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009:119). These meanings are 
directed towards certain objectives, varied and multiple, and lead the investigator to search for 
complex views instead of narrowing the meanings into a few categories or ideas.  
 
The objective of the study was therefore to rely as much as possible on the participants‟ views 
of the situation (Creswell 2013:24-   .  As Baxter and Jack (2008:545) put it, this paradigm 
perceives truth as relative and dependent on one‟s view, and Daymon and Holloway 
(        ) and Golafshani (        ) add that in such a paradigm qualitative research 
methods are used.  
 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study has a holistic case-study design, as the researcher investigated only one of 
SASSA‟s departments, namely the SCM department.  
 
Saunders et al (2009:147) suggest that if a research is concerned with a single organisation 
as a whole, the organisation is treated as a holistic case study, while Salkind (2014:287) 
argues that case studies are appropriate only if you wish to complete an in-depth study of one 
type of phenomenon. 
 
Yin (2012:18) is more specific and defines a case-study design as an “empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. 
   
 
 
Case studies have both advantages and disadvantages. According to Hofstee (        -    , 
one of the advantages of this technique is that it is not as comprehensive as other techniques, 
namely surveys and comparative analysis, which require more time and are more expensive. 
Hofstee however adds that the case-study technique has the disadvantage that it is difficult to 
stay focused and obtain unbiased results that can be generalised with confidence, and that it 
is very difficult to use on its own.  
 
Although other scholars such as Daymon and Holloway (2011:119) and Flyvbjerg (2006:241) 
mention that the results produced from a single case-study research run the risk of being 
biased and subjective, Flyvbjerg (2006:241) asserts that this idea is wrong or misleading, 
because “a case study design is a necessary and sufficient method for certain important 
research tasks in the social sciences”  Djurić, Nikolić and Vuković (2010:183) concur with 
Flyvbjerg that a case study is a reliable methodology if executed with due care.  
 
From the above it was deduced that the result of this study could be generalised to all 
government departments and entities, as they use the same procurement policies, legislation, 
financial prescripts and guidelines as prescribed by the National Treasury.  
 
This is a case study about SASSA, which has a head office in Pretoria and a regional office in 
each of the country‟s nine provinces  For the purposes of this study, the following are critical 
units at SASSA‟s head office (SASSA        ,     a   -53, 2016b:9-      
 
 Internal-audit unit – responsible for the auditing of internal controls 
 Internal-control unit –responsible for developing internal controls 
 Risk-assessment unit –responsible for risk assessment 
 Fraud- and corruption-investigations unit – responsible for the fraud and corruption 
strategy 
 Demand-management unit – responsible for selecting or nominating suitable EMEs when 
SASSA requires a service or goods 
 Acquisition and provisioning unit – responsible for requesting quotations from the 
selected EMEs 
 SCM-compliance unit – responsible for verifying and validating the compliance of the 
selected EMEs 
 
   
 
(In SASSA‟s regional offices, the position is as follows  The demand- management unit and 
the acquisition and provisioning unit are combined into one SCM unit with two SCM 
practitioners -- one for demand management and one for acquisition and provisioning. These 
two SCM practitioners are also responsible for compliance verification and validation of the 
selected EMEs.)  
 
Below follows the research method used for data collection, sampling and data analysis.  
 
3.4. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.4.1 Data-collection technique 
Multiple sources of evidence data-collection techniques were used. Saunders et al (2009:146) 
refer to multiple sources of evidence as a technique in which a variety of data sources are 
used. In this study, documents and semi-structured interviews were used for data collection.  
 
The most important advantage of using multiple sources of evidence techniques is that 
enquiry converging lines, a process of triangulation and corroboration, are developed. 
According to Yin (        , the case-study findings and the conclusion are likely to be more 
convincing and accurate if based on several different sources of information.  
 
Below follows a discussion of both documents and interviews as sources of data in this study: 
 
3.4.1.1 Documents 
The researcher collected documents about SCM policies, processes and procedures; risk 
management; and fraud and corruption published by SASSA. (Note: Wagner, Kawulich & 
Garner [        ] refer to public documents as government policies.) 
 
  
   
 
The following published SASSA documents (attached as per appendix E) were collected: 
 
Figure 3: Published SASSA policies, processes and procedure documents (see 
appendix E) 
 
Number 
of the 
document 
Title of the document Reason for use 
Doc 1 SASSA SCM policy 
 
To critically analyse SASSA‟s SCM pro-
cesses in order to identify the risk of 
possible tax evasion within these 
processes. 
Doc 2 SASSA SCM delegations To examine SASSA‟s SCM rules about and 
conditions of delegations in order to identify 
the risk of possible tax evasion within these 
delegations. 
Doc 3 Central supplier database instructions 
 
 
To scrutinise the CSD instructions in order 
to identify the risk of possible tax evasion 
within these instructions. 
Doc 4 Fraud-prevention strategy To understand SASSA‟s fraud and cor-
ruption strategy and to investigate whether it 
covers the risk of possible tax evasion. 
Doc 5 Risk-management strategy To understand SASSA‟s risk-management 
process and to investigate whether it covers 
the risk of possible tax evasion. 
Doc 6 SASSA‟s annual reports for 2012 to 
       
To investigate how successful SASSA is in 
terms of implementing the existing SCM 
internal controls and what the conse-
quences are of not complying with these 
controls. 
 
(Fig 3: Compiled by the researcher from published SASSA documents.) 
 
The above-mentioned SASSA policies and procedures documents were used for proving the 
ineffectiveness and inconsistent implementation of internal controls developed for preventing 
possible tax evasion.  
 
The other data-collection method used in this study was interviews, which will be discussed 
next. 
 
  
   
 
 
3.4.1.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with members of staff at SASSA‟s head office were conducted. 
This method of data-collectionwas used for exploring the existing internal controls within 
SASSA‟s SCM processes developed for preventing possible tax evasion by EMEs contracting 
with SASSA through interacting with SASSA officials.  
 
This study focused on officials employed in the internal-audit, internal-control, risk- 
management, fraud- and corruption-investigations and three SCM units, namely the demand-
management, acquisition and provisioning and SCM-compliance units. Semi-structured 
interviews allowed the researcher to collect a rich and detailed set of data in order to come to 
a sound conclusion (Saunders et al             
 
Personal interviews were conducted with selected members of head-office staff on SASSA‟s 
head-office premises in Pretoria for a maximum time of 30 to 45 minutes per participant.  
 
During the interview, probing questions were asked for exploring responses about the 
ineffective and inconsistent implementation of internal controls developed for EMEs in order to 
prevent tax evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes.  
 
The data collected from the interviews were also used for proving the ineffectiveness and 
inconsistent implementation of SASSA‟s internal controls designed for EMEs in order to 
minimise possible fraud, corruption and tax evasion within SASSA‟s SCM processes. 
 
3.4.2 Population and sampling 
A convenient purposive sampling process was followed. The advantages of this type of 
sampling are that this method is much less complicated and expensive than others (Salkind 
         , and that the researcher is a senior manager responsible for grants accounting in 
SASSA‟s Finance branch. So that it was not a challenge for him to access data required for 
the study.  
 
A sample of 7 SASSA head-office officials was selected to be interviewed. Only SASSA 
officials who could answer the questions were selected. One staff member from each unit at 
SASSA‟s head office was selected, that is, one each from the internal-audit, internal-control, 
risk-assessment, fraud- and corruption-investigations-, demand-management, acquisition and 
provisioning and SCM-compliance units.  
   
 
 
Interviews were conducted with SASSA head-office staff only because SASSA is a national 
public entity – that is, policies, processes and procedures are developed at head office and 
applied across SASSA as a whole, including the regions (SASSA 2016b     
 
The disadvantage of this method naturally is that the probability of data chosen is not known, 
and that the researcher cannot claim that his or her sample is representative of the larger 
population (Salkind 2014). The fact that the data of other entities were not part of the sampling 
illustrates the non-retrospectivity of the sample (Salkind 2014). However, this does not 
threaten the generalisation of the conclusion, because SASSA operates within the same 
government policies and legislation as other national public entities. (It has been argued by 
Gerring [        ] that a case study is an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to 
generalise across a larger set of units.) 
 
It had been the researcher‟s intention to interview    SASSA staff members (  from head 
office and 10 from the regional offices), but then he set the saturation point at 7 members of 
staff from head office, which meant that the interviews would stop once the data reached the 
saturation point.  
 
Content thematic analysis was used for analysing data collected from both documents and 
interviews. Francis, Johnston, Robertson, Glidewell, Entwistle, Eccles and Grimshaw (2010:3) 
argue that in studies using semi-structured interviews that are analysed using content 
analysis, the sample size is often justified on the basis of interviewing participants until data 
saturation is reached. Data saturation is reached when there is enough information to replicate 
the study when the ability to obtain additional new information has been attained, and when 
further coding is no longer feasible (Fusch, Lawrence & Ness 2015:1408). 
 
3.4.3 Data analysis 
The data collected were analysed following the qualitative content analysis, using a specific 
Braun and Clarke method of thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic 
analysis as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within the data. One of 
the advantages of thematic analysis is that the phases of the analysis are similar to other 
qualitative-research analytical methods and are flexible (Braun & Clarke 2006:79). 
 
Data were collected from both documents and interviews. The data collected from the 
documents and the interviews were analysed concurrently. Bowen (2009:35) highlights the 
   
 
fact that data from documents may be analysed together with data from interviews so that the 
themes will emerge across the two sets of data.  
 
The process used by the researcher for analysing the data can be described as follows (Braun 
& Clarke 2006:87): 
 
 The researcher collected the data himself from SASSA head-office staff through 
interviews, which helped him to be more familiar with the data. The transcription of the 
data was also done by the researcher, which also brought him more in touch with the data. 
 
 Documents selected for analysis were also examined in order to understand SASSA‟s 
SCM policies, processes and procedures regarding possible tax evasion, fraud and 
corruption, as outlined in each document. 
 
 The data collected from the interviews were coded electronically (through an MS-word 
program, whereas the data collected from the documents were coded manually, because 
of the documents being in a PDF format  The researcher read from each respondent‟s 
transcribed data and highlighted interesting points relating to the questions asked. Initial 
codes were generated from the highlighted data and added to the list of ideas that came to 
mind when the researcher was transcribing the data.  
 
 Once the data were coded and organised accordingly, the codes identified were sorted 
into potential themes.  
 
 The identified themes were reviewed before they were finalised. To review the themes, the 
researcher first read all the collated extracts for each theme and considered whether they 
appeared to form a coherent pattern. Secondly, the researcher considered the validity of 
individual themes regarding the set of data. At the end of this phase, the researcher knew 
exactly what the different themes were, how they fitted together, and what his overall 
impression of the data was. 
 
 Before the themes were finally named, they were defined and further refined by analysing 
the data within each theme. This meant that the researcher conducted a detailed analysis 
for each individual theme before naming the theme. 
  
   
 
The end results of the analysis were final themes as envisaged by the researcher. According 
to Saunders et al (2009:490), the central task during data analysis is to identify common 
themes in the research project and predict or presume the relationship between them. The 
different themes were identified in the literature review, and were used to both present and 
analyse the data. 
 
3.4.4 Verification of trustworthiness  
 
In the discussion below, credibility and transferability were used for testing the trustworthiness 
of the case-study result (Graneheim & Lundman 2004:109). (According to Salkind (2014:65), 
the main reason for verifying the truthfulness of the study result is to minimise errors and 
biasness.) 
 
Credibility 
 
Triangulation is one way of enhancing credibility in qualitative research (Baxter & Jack 
2008:556; Webb 2009a:125). In this study, credibility was obtained by collecting data from 
both document analysis and interviews conducted by the researcher with SASSA members of 
staff with experience in their individual fields. All the analysed documents were signed by the 
appropriate authority. Credibility thus “emphasises striving for truth through the qualitative 
research process” (Schurink & Auriacombe            
 
The researcher built trust by honouring the participants‟ anonymity during the interviews so 
that the participants could feel free to respond to any question without any fear of being 
victimised. All the SASSA policy documents included in the study were published documents.  
 
A database was created for storing all the data selected for analysis. All case-study 
documents collected at SASSA during the documentation analysis and interviews were 
converted into PDF copies and stored electronically in the database. This database increased 
the trustworthiness of the entire case study (Yin 2012:119). 
 
Transferability 
 
According to Polit and Hungler (in Graneheim & Lundman 2004:110), transferability refers to 
“the extent to which the findings can be transferred to other settings or groups”, and as far as 
this study is concerned, transferability refers to the extent to which the results can be 
   
 
transferred to other departments and government entities. The  transferability of this study was 
enhanced by selecting SASSA as a case, highlighting the nature of the internal controls 
implemented in the SCM of any department or entity of government. As such, the study 
findings may be applicable to any government department or entity. 
 
3.5. LIMITATIONS 
 
The researcher obtained and analysed only data from SASSA‟s internal controls designed for 
EMEs for minimising possible fraud, corruption and tax evasion within the SCM department, 
and only SASSA members of staff at head office involved in the SCM processes were 
interviewed.  
 
Other members of staff from other head-office branches, for instance Corporate Services, 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Grants Operations, Policy Implementation 
Support and Strategy and Business Development (SASSA 2016a    , and all members of 
staff from SASSA‟s regional offices were not interviewed, due to limited funds for travelling 
and data saturation. It was also impossible to collect data from other national public entities, 
because it would have been time-consuming and the costs would have been exorbitant. 
 
3.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
As can be seen from appendix G, the researcher was given permission by SASSA‟s CEO, Dr 
V Petersen, to use SASSA as a research environment for investigating gaps for possible tax 
evasion in SASSA‟s SCM internal controls  Therefore, related SASSA SCM policies and 
procedures documents were downloaded from the internet and analysed. This study will make 
a positive contribution as far as SASSA‟s risk-management strategy is concerned in that it will 
help reduce possible tax evasion and its associated crimes, namely fraud and corruption. 
 
Participants selected for interviews received information about informed consent via e-mail. 
Once the consent form had been signed, the date for the interview was agreed upon. 
 
Participants interested in the findings of this study can contact either the researcher or the 
researcher‟s supervisor or co-supervisor directly. 
 
   
 
The participants in this study will have benefited by having gained more knowledge and 
understanding of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes. Also, SASSA„s internal 
controls regarding possible tax evasion within its SCM processes, and consequently SARS‟s 
revenue-collection levels, will be improved.  
 
So far, the participants have not experienced any inconveniences (apart from perhaps the time 
it took to do the interviews) or bad experiences (such as having been identified - they have 
been assured indefinite anonymity and confidentiality) from having participated in the study. 
 
The Unisa‟s  College of Accounting Sciences Research Ethics Review Committee granted the 
researcher ethical clearance for conducting interviews (see appendix F). 
 
3.7. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 
This chapter discussed the research methodology, , and the next chapter will present the data 
gathered from the participants selected from SASSA and the document analysis for exploring 
the ineffectiveness and inconsistent implementation of SASSA‟s SCM internal controls 
developed for EMEs contracting with the agency, in order to minimise the risk of possible tax 
evasion.  
 
The data will be presented as follows: 
 
 SASSA‟s procurement and source of revenue 
 risk factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
 possible solutions and strategies 
 
  
   
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It was the researcher‟s intention to investigate and examine the effectiveness and 
implementation of SASSA‟s SCM internal controls designed for dealing with the risk of 
possible tax evasion that could be committed by EMEs when contracting with SASSA.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were held with different participants at SASSA‟s head office  
Officials from the SCM demand-management, acquisition and provisioning, SCM-compliance, 
internal-control, internal-audit, risk-management and fraud and corruption unit were included. 
The data collected from the interviews and the document reviews were analysed using content 
analysis, as presented in chapter 3 above. 
 
Below follows a presentation of the responses of the participants selected from the units 
involved in SASSA‟s SCM value chain and a presentation of the documents selected for 
review. The analysis should be read in conjunction with appendices A to E. 
 
For the purpose of the study, the researcher identified the participants in the following manner: 
 
 Participant SCM1: A senior official in the demand-management unit in the SCM 
department responsible for all demand-management activities at SASSA. 
 Participant SCM2: A senior official in the acquisition unit in the SCM department 
responsible for all acquisition activities at SASSA. 
 Participant SCM3: A senior official in the compliance unit in the SCM department 
responsible for all SCM-compliance activities at SASSA.  
 Participant INM4: A senior official in the internal-control unit responsible for all internal-
control matters at SASSA.  
 Participant FCI5: A senior official in the fraud and corruption unit responsible for all 
fraud-related activities at SASSA. 
 Participant INA6: A senior official in the internal-audit unit responsible for all internal-
audit activities at SASSA. 
 Participant RAS7: A senior official in the risk-management unit responsible for all risk-
management activities at SASSA. 
 
   
 
The data presented in this chapter are to prove that the ineffectiveness and inconsistent 
implementation of the internal controls designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA could 
result into possible tax evasion. Figure 4 below presents the flow of the discussion from 
section 4.2 to section 4.4, and how the data collected through interviews and document 
analysis was corroborated: 
 
Figure 4: Summary of the data presentation and analysis 
 
SECT 4.2, THEME 1: SASSA’S SOURCE OF REVENUE 
Participant(s) Document(s) Ineffectiveness of internal 
controls 
Inconsistent implementation 
of internal controls 
All participants were asked the 
question in sect 4.2 below. 
 
All participants understood how 
SASSA is funded. 
All participants understood 
how SASSA is funded. 
 
SECT 4.3, THEME 2: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POSSIBLE TAX EVASION 
Participant(s) Document(s) Ineffectiveness of the exist-
ing internal controls is 
proven by the following: 
Inconsistent implementation of the 
existing internal controls is proven 
by the following:  
 SASSA’s SCM 
policy 
A. process prescribed by the 
SCM policy 
 
 SASSA’s SCM 
delegations 
B. process prescribed by the 
SCM delegations document  
 
 CSD instructions C. processes prescribed in 
the Central Supplier 
Database instructions 
 
Participants SCM1, SCM2 
and SCM3 were asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph D of sect 4.3.1 
below. 
 
D. step-by step process 
for appointing an EME at 
SASSA  
All participants were 
asked questions in 
paragraph E of sect 4.3.1 
below. 
 
E. possible tax evasion, fraud 
and corruption in the SCM 
processes 
 
   
 
SECT 4.3, THEME 2: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POSSIBLE TAX EVASION 
Participant(s) Document(s) Ineffectiveness of the exist-
ing internal controls is 
proven by the following: 
Inconsistent implementation of the 
existing internal controls is proven 
by the following:  
Participant FCI5 was asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph F of sect 4.3.1 
below. 
SASSA’s fraud- 
prevention 
strategy 
F. strategy for dealing with 
fraud and corruption 
activities 
 
 
Participant RAS7 was asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph G of sect 4.3.1 
below. 
SASSA’s risk- 
management 
strategy 
G. risk-management 
processes 
 
 
Participant INM4 was asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph A of sect 4.3.2 
below. 
SASSA’s annual 
reports 
 A. A. irregular expenditure 
Participant RAS7 was asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph B of sect 4.3.2 
below. 
  
B. regular review of risk- assessment 
and internal controls 
Participants SCM1, SCM2 
and SCM3 were asked 
questions presented in 
paragraph C of sect 4.3.2 
below. 
 
 C. fraud and corruption 
Participants INM4 and INA6 
were asked questions pre-
sented in paragraph D of 
sect 4.3.2 below. 
  D. limited scope for dealing with 
possible tax evasion 
 
SECT 4.4, THEME 3: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES 
Participant(s) Document(s) Improving the 
effectiveness of the 
existing internal controls 
Improving consistency in implementing 
the existing internal controls 
Participants SCM1, SCM2, 
SCM3 and FCI5 were asked 
questions presented in sect 
 
Develop internal controls 
for dealing with the risk 
 
   
 
4.4.1 below. of possible tax evasion. 
Participants RAS7, INM4 
and INA6 were asked 
questions presented in sect 
4.4.2 below. 
  
Incorporate the risk of possible tax evasion 
in SASSA’s risk-management strategy and 
in the scope of the internal-audit unit and 
the internal-control unit. 
 
(Fig 4: Compiled by the researcher from participants‟ responses and document analysis    
 
4.2. SASSA’S PROCUREMENT AND SOURCE OF REVENUE 
 
The question below was posed to all the participants to determine whether they understood 
how SASSA is funded, so that they could contribute in an effective manner to the strategy of 
minimising possible tax evasion that the researcher envisaged to propose. 
 
Another reason for this question was to confirm that SASSA is funded from revenue collected 
through taxes, through the South African budget process. The participants were asked the 
following question: 
 
 What is your understanding of government’s revenue-collection process used for funding 
SASSA? 
 
All the participants, in all the units, highlighted the fact that SASSA is funded from revenue 
collected from companies and individual taxpayers through taxes levied by SARS. Participant 
SCM1 highlighted the fact that government collects its revenue for funding SASSA and other 
government departments through the following types of tax: 
 
 personal income tax  
 Value-Added Tax   
 company taxes  
 foreign and custom taxes 
 
Neu, Everett and Rahaman (      concur that all procurement activities are funded from 
revenue collected through taxes. In the 2017 to 2018 financial year, SASSA was allocated an 
amount of R2.1512 billion for procuring goods and services from EMEs (National Treasury 
2017a). 
 
   
 
Next follows a discussion of the risk factors that could hamper the collection of revenue within 
SASSA‟s SCM processes. 
 
4.3. RISK FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO POSSIBLE TAX EVASION 
 
SASSA‟s SCM processes are governed by the following documents: SASSA SCM policy 
(SASSA 2016b), SASSA SCM delegations (SASSA 2015f) and the CSD guidelines. Jackson 
and Stent (      ) define “internal control” as policies and procedures put in place by an 
organisation for achieving the orderly and efficient conduct of the business. Examples 
mentioned include internal controls for ensuring the prevention and detection of fraud and 
error. 
 
All the documents presented and analysed below were prepared by SASSA‟s executive 
management and approved by SASSA‟s chief executive officer (CEO), as referred to in 
appendix E. These documents must be implemented by SASSA‟s officials, both at head office 
and at the regional offices. These documents are discussed in conjunction with the responses 
of the participants selected from SASSA officials involved in the SCM value chain. 
 
The purpose of the analysis below was, first, to analyse and understand SASSA‟s SCM 
processes in order to establish whether the internal controls developed for dealing with the risk 
of possible tax evasion were effective enough (see the presentation and analysis in sect      , 
from A to G).  
 
Secondly, the purpose of the analysis was to investigate whether SASSA‟s risk-management 
process and fraud and corruption strategy were incorporated in the risk of possible tax evasion 
within the processes (see sect      , from A to D) and lastly, possible solutions for dealing with 
possible tax evasion within the SCM processes (see sect       
 
4.3.1 Ineffectiveness of the existing internal controls 
 
A. Process prescribed by the SCM policy 
 
SASSA‟s SCM policy, approved by SASSA‟s CEO on   February      and implemented from 
the date of approval, applies to SASSA officials nationally, at both the head office and the 
regional offices (SASSA 2016b:8). 
   
 
 
The main objectives identified when analysing this policy document (SASSA 2016b) were as 
follows:  
 
 to standardise SASSA‟s SCM processes, and 
 to ensure compliance with all procurement legislation, policies and regulations  
 
As indicated by the analysis, first, an EME must qualify as an EME, and secondly, the EME 
must comply with the tax-compliance requirements set out in SASSA‟s SCM policy, namely: 
“The original and the valid Tax Clearance Certificate from a recommended service provider for 
all procurement above R30 000, VAT included” (SASSA 2016b      
 
However, SASSA‟s SCM policy does not provide a strategy for ensuring that the service 
providers or EMEs comply with this requirement in a true and honest manner. This poses a 
risk of possible tax evasion by EMEs when contracting with SASSA, because there is no way 
of verifying the truthfulness of the document submitted by the EMEs.  
 
An example of “dishonesty” here is when the directors of a particular company registered a 
new company every time that they were required to submit a tax-clearance certificate (SAIPA 
2012). The intention there was not only to deceive SASSA in order to acquire a contract for 
supplying goods or services without meeting the requirement, but also (indirectly) to deceive 
SARS, because the revenue that should have been declared to SARS could possibly never be 
declared, because of a new company having been registered by the same directors of the old 
company. 
 
EMEs have been identified by SARS (       ) as a high-risk group for non-tax-compliance in 
South Africa. EMEs namely falsify their tax returns or misrepresent their books and accounts, 
disguise certain transactions, deliberately not disclose income in full and either inadvertently or 
deliberately overstate deductible expenditure (Davis 2014:11). This is in order to appear to be 
tax-compliant and obtain a tax-clearance certificate so as to secure a contract with any 
government department or entity.  
 
SASSA‟s SCM policy regarding the procurement of goods or services is implemented by 
SASSA employees in the SCM department within the powers delegated to them by SASSA‟s 
CEO, as outlined in section 4.2.2 below.   
 
   
 
B. Process prescribed by the SASSA SCM delegations document 
 
In terms of section 56 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, an executive authority 
may delegate certain powers to designated officials within SASSA  This resulted in SASSA‟s 
executive management developing a document called SASSA SCM delegations (2015f), 
approved by SASSA‟s CEO on   May      and implemented throughout South Africa from 1 
June 2015 onwards. This document contains the rules and conditions regarding these 
delegated powers (SASSA 2015f:2). The hierarchy of this delegation is summarised as 
follows: 
 
Figure 5: Summary of the delegation in SASSA’s SCM department 
 
Category  Amount Purpose and 
requirements 
Officials involved 
Category A: Invitation  
for and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R1 – R500  (Normally referred to as petty 
cash.) 
Category B: Invitation 
and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R501 – R2 000 Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
One quotation required. 
Admin officer SCM: approves 
the request for procurement. 
 
Assistant manager SCM: 
approves the order. 
Category C: Invitation for 
and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R2 001 – R30 000 Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Three quotations requi-
red. 
Admin officer SCM: approves 
the request for procurement. 
 
Assistant manager SCM: 
approves the order. 
Category D: Invitation for 
and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R30 001 – R100 000 Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Three quotations requi-
red. 
Admin officer SCM: approves 
the request for procurement 
 
Assistant manager SCM: 
approves the order. 
Category E: Invitation for 
and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R100 001 – R200 000 Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Three quotations requi-
red. 
Admin officer SCM: approves 
the request for procurement. 
 
Assistant manager SCM: 
approves the order. 
Category F: Invitation for 
and acceptance of 
quotations. 
R200 001 – R500 000 Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Three quotations requi-
red. 
Assistant manager SCM: 
approves the request for 
procurement. 
 
Senior/general manager  
SCM: approves the order. 
Category G: Invitation 
for bids. 
Above R500     Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Bids required. 
CEO: approves the business 
case (ie bids). 
BAC*: approves the 
specification and the 
advertising of the tender. 
Category H: Invitation for 
bids. 
Up to R5 000     Procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
Bids required. 
BAC*:  approves the 
evaluation report. 
Category I: Invitation for 
bids. 
Above R5 000 000  Procurement of goods 
and services. 
CEO: approves the business 
case (ie bids). 
   
 
Category  Amount Purpose and 
requirements 
Officials involved 
 
Bids required. 
BAC*: approves the 
specification and the 
advertising of the tender. 
 
*BAC: bid-adjudication committee   
(Fig 5: Compiled by the researcher from SASSA 2015f:6-     
 
As can be seen from figure 5 above, a request for the procurement of goods or services 
between R1 and R500 000 can, depending on the amount involved, be approved by an 
administrative officer (the lowest level), the assistant manager (the second-lowest level) up to 
the senior manager (the most senior person in the SCM department ). A request for the 
procurement of goods or services above R500     must be approved by SASSA‟s CEO 
and/or the bid-adjudication committee (BAC). 
 
C. Processes prescribed by the CSD instructions 
 
SASSA has been using the CSD instructions (National Treasury 2016c) since 1 April 2016. 
After being approved by the chief procurement officer, Kenneth Brown, on 22 April 2016, the 
instructions were sent through to all accounting officers and accounting authorities, which, in 
the case of SASSA, is SASSA‟s CEO   
 
According to these instructions, EMEs are considered by SASSA as prospective suppliers of 
goods or services only if registered on the CSD system. The purpose of the CSD is to improve 
the level of compliance in all spheres, including tax compliance, and to confirm the BEE status 
of the EMEs with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC). 
 
The purpose of analysing the CSD-instructions document was to determine how the CSD 
system rotates the EMEs to ensure that directors who were given business before do not get 
the opportunity again over the other directors.  
 
After reviewing the CSD-instructions document, it was not clear how EMEs are rotated to 
guard against fraud and corruption activities, including possible tax evasion. 
 
Below follows the step-by step process for appointing an EME, as outlined by the participants 
in the study. 
 
  
   
 
D. Step-by step process for appointing an EME at SASSA 
 
The documents reviewed above (from A to C), are discussed in clear detail (as presented by 
the participants during the interviews conducted at SASSA‟s head office on    April       
below. The participants were asked the following questions: 
 
 What process is followed when selecting or nominating an EME for providing goods or 
services to SASSA? 
 
 What documents do you handle during the process? 
 
In terms of SASSA‟s SCM policy, there are three units within the SCM department that deal 
with the procurement of goods and services, namely the demand-management, acquisition 
and compliance units, each of them with its own responsibility in appointing an EME to provide 
services or goods to SASSA (SASSA 2016b:9). The process flow of appointing an EME is 
shown in figure 6 below:  
 
Figure 6: Process flow of appointing an EME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SCM units 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig 6: Compiled by the researcher from SASSA 2016b.) 
 
Requesting Unit 
SCM Demand 
Management Unit 
SCM Acquisition 
Unit 
SCM Compliance 
Unit 
Contract issued to 
EME 
   
 
When asked the following question:  
 
What process do you follow when selecting or nominating an EME for providing services or 
goods to SASSA, and what documents do you handle during the process?,  
 
participants SCM1, SCM2 and SCM3, in face-to-face individual interviews conducted on 24 
April 2017, gave the following detailed step-by-step account of the process flow indicated in 
figures 5 and 6 above:   
 
The process begins when any of the SASSA units submits a request (in which case the unit is 
called a requesting unit) to purchase goods or services. Ten steps are then followed: 
 
Step 1:  The requesting unit (which can be any unit within SASSA) sends a request or 
requisition to the demand-management unit, stating the type of service or goods that 
they intend to procure.  
 
Step 2:  The demand-management unit determines which procurement method to use -- 
namely the quotation, the tender or the petty-cash method. The quotation method is 
used when the service or goods to be procured amount to less than R500 000, the 
tender method is used for tenders above R500  00, and the petty-cash method is 
used for any purchase between R1 and R500.  
 
Step 3:  Once the procurement method is established, EMEs are sourced from the CSD, 
introduced by the National Treasury on 1 April       
 The EMEs register themselves online, via a cell phone, a computer, etc.  
 Once the supplier is registered on the CSD system, the system produces what is 
called an “MAAA number”  
 The SCM practitioner in the demand-management unit logs in to his or her profile 
on the CSD. 
 The practitioner opens and searches the link for suppliers. 
 The practitioner punches in the commodity wanted using the MAAA number, for 
example “printing”  
 The practitioner punches in that he or she is looking for tax-compliant companies 
with approved banking details, and also punches in the place of delivery (eg: 
Pretoria in Gauteng). 
   
 
 The system then provides the practitioner with a complete list of tax-compliant 
suppliers in Gauteng who provide the services or goods needed. 
 From that list the practitioner should select at least three suppliers. There may be 
more than three suppliers, but then three are randomly selected from the initial 
ones. 
 
Step 4:  The details of the three selected suppliers, taken from the CSD report, are recorded 
in the nomination register, to which the CSD report and the request from the 
requesting unit are attached. A person other than the one who selected the suppliers 
then verifies the selection process before submitting the request to the acquisition 
unit. 
 
Step 5:  The file, consisting of the nomination register, the CSD report and the request from 
the requesting unit, is submitted by the demand-management unit to the acquisition 
unit in order to facilitate the request for quotation (RFQ) from the EMEs. The CSD 
system does not indicate whether the supplier is an EME or not - it simply shows the 
whole list of suppliers, even those that are not EMEs, and consequently the EMEs 
are selected manually. 
 
Step 6:  The acquisition unit double-checks the compliance status of the selected EMEs by 
running a CSD report to see whether  
 the EMEs were selected from the suppliers registered on the CSD system, 
 the EMEs are in business, that is, active on the CIPC database, and  
 the EMEs comply with all the other SCM aspects, including the tax requirements. 
Once the acquisition unit is satisfied with all the aspects of compliance, a request 
is sent out to all the EMEs that met the requirements to submit a quotation for 
the service or goods required  This process is normally called the “RFQ” process   
 
Step 7:  The successful quotation will be the lowest one received. 
 
Step 8:  The acquisition unit prepares a file with all the documents required by the SCM and 
submits the file to the compliance unit. A checklist included in the file is used for 
checking and ticking off all the information required before awarding the contract. 
 
Step 9:  The compliance unit validates and verifies the information submitted with the 
checklist to see whether 
   
 
 the EME‟s tax-clearance has been properly confirmed with SARS 
 the SCM policies and regulations have been complied with  
 the Treasury regulations and directives have been complied with 
 all other related SCM requirements have been adhered to 
 
Step 10:  Once all the compliance requirements have been validated and verified, an order is 
issued to the EME stating that all SASSA‟s SCM requirements were met  Such an 
order is an indication that the EME has been awarded the contract for providing the 
service or goods to SASSA. Once the EME has completed the work or delivered the 
goods required, it sends an invoice to SASSA, which then pays the amount owed 
into the EME‟s bank account   
 
At times, the above process is hampered by fraud and corruption activities, including the risk 
of possible tax evasion taking place in different forms. Below follows a discussion about how 
possible tax evasion relates to fraud and corruption within the SCM processes:   
 
E. Possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption within the SCM processes 
 
All the participants were asked the following questions to establish whether they understood 
the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption”  
   
 What is your understanding of the concept of tax evasion?  
 How do tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM 
processes? 
 
In section 4.2 above, all the participants agreed that SASSA is funded through taxes collected 
by SARS. All the participants further argued that the collection of more revenue is hampered 
by the risk of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes. Tax evasion was defined as an 
illegal practice by a person or companies to intentionally under-declare or omit certain income 
in order to pay less tax.  
 
Participant SCM2 argued that SARS collected R30 billion less in the 2017 tax year than it did 
in the      tax year because of tax evasion and “fraud and corruption”, confirming Hessami‟s 
(2014) statement that government lost billions to corruption. SCM2 further argued that tax 
   
 
evasion and “fraud and corruption” go hand in hand, by stating the following  “If there was no 
corruption we wouldn‟t have tax evasion ’’ 
 
Participant SCM ‟s statement was in line with that of Escobari (     , who says that high 
levels of corruption decrease compliance levels, eventually ending up in tax evasion. 
 
All the other participants also stated that there is a relationship between tax evasion and “fraud 
and corruption”, and highlighted the following examples that demonstrate the relationship 
between the two: 
 
 Fraud and corruption in SCM is when the supplier provides a fraudulent tax- clearance 
certificate.  
 A supplier may collude with a SARS official to issue a tax-clearance certificate while the 
supplier or the service provider does not have a good standing as far as his/her tax 
affairs are concerned. 
    In cases of collusion, kickbacks paid in cash between the fraudsters will never be 
declared as income to SARS. 
 
As far as the literature is concerned, Burguet, Ganuza and Garcia Montalvo (2016) and De 
Lange (2013) strengthens most of the participants‟ view that collusion between employees and 
suppliers to defraud the state or bypass the procurement policies and processes, concealment 
and misrepresentation of material facts, and unjustified single-source awards (eg, a member 
of the internal staff of an organisation inviting one quotation from one supplier without 
justifiable reasons) are the main fraud and corruption activities within the SCM processes.  
  
It must be noted that as yet there are no available statistics about SASSA SCM practitioners 
and EMEs colluding. However, the researcher thinks it to be of critical importance to highlight 
the fact that there is a high possibility of SASSA SCM practitioners colluding with EMEs in 
fraud and corruption activities within SCM based on the behaviour of SASSA officials in 
general, as presented in figures 7 and 8 below: 
 
  
   
 
Figure 7:  Number of SASSA officials implicated in fraud and corruption activities per 
financial year 
 
 
(Fig 7: Compiled by the researcher from SASSA 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016a.) 
 
Figure 8:  Increasing number of SASSA officials implicated in fraud and corruption 
activities 
 
 
(Fig 8: Compiled by the researcher from SASSA 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016a.) 
 
Figures 7 and 8 above depict the growing trend of SASSA officials participating in fraud and 
corruption activities, namely from 84 as on 31 March 2011 to 366 as on 31 March 2016 
(SASSA  2013:21, 2014:12, 2015a:24, 2016a:55).  
 
This trend is worrying, as the number is increasing fast and there is a possibility that the funds 
lost because of these criminal activities may never be recovered, even if the perpetrators are 
convicted. The most recently reported monetary loss because of fraud and corruption activities 
within SASSA was R145 million, of which only R2.3 million was recovered for the period 1 
April 2012 to 28 February 2015 (SASSA 2015g). 
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The former minister of social development, Bathabile Dlamini, at a media briefing outside 
parliament ahead of the second annual anti-corruption conference hosted by SASSA, stated 
that even though government is winning the war against fraud and corruption, she was worried 
that only a fraction of the stolen money is recovered (Business Day 2015).  
 
The challenge of being unable to recover the money could also result in tax evasion. The 
following question was posed to participant FCI , senior official in SASSA‟s fraud and 
corruption unit:  
 
How successful has SASSA been in dealing with fraud and corruption activities relating to the 
SCM processes?  
 
Participant FCI5 seemed not to understand the question because he/she answered that the 
fraud and corruption unit detects fraud by determining whether there are any omissions in the 
processes or whether the policy was not followed.  
 
The researcher then asked a follow-up question, namely:  
 
How have you been doing in terms of recovering what was lost because of fraud and 
corruption activities at SASSA, particularly losses in the SCM department?  
 
However, when participant FCI5 was asked the following question: 
 
What were the challenges in recovering the money that was lost,  
 
He/she indicated that sometimes it is more difficult to recover monies lost because of fraud 
and corruption when a supplier is involved than it is to deal with staff still employed by SASSA. 
 
Participant FCI5 further said that they are succeeding, especially where fraud and corruption 
activities by someone still employed by SASSA is concerned, but EMEs pose a problem, 
because the function of dealing with EMEs involved in fraud and corruption activities falls 
outside the mandate of the fraud and corruption unit. EME cases are referred to the external 
service provider or to law-enforcement agencies. 
 
   
 
When participant FC15 was asked about the challenges in recovering the money, he/she 
indicated that it is difficult to recover money from EMEs that were involved in fraud and 
corruption activities at SASSA.  
 
When asked,  
 
How successful has SASSA been in recovering funds lost because of fraud and corruption 
activities at SASSA, particularly within the supply-chain processes, 
 
participant INA6 agreed with both Minister Dlamini and participant FCI5, saying that SASSA 
was not winning in terms of recovering monies lost because of fraud and corruption activities, 
hence more preventative measures should be put in place to prevent  such activities within 
SASSA.  
 
Participant INA6 further mentioned that, first, according to his/her experience at SASSA most 
SASSA officials after committing a crime relating to fraud and corruption resign, so that it is 
difficult to get information from such officials.  
 
Secondly, some officials after committing a crime get employment in other state departments 
and will not co-operate with the recovery process, so that the amount owed to SASSA ends up 
being written off.  
 
Lastly, once the EMEs realise that they are being investigated they liquidate themselves and 
government never recovers the money, resulting in a loss to the fiscus.   
 
Participants SCM1, SCM2 and SCM3 were asked the following questions by the researcher to 
establish whether the existing internal controls were effective enough to minimise the risk of 
possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption within the SCM processes: 
 
 How do you rotate the EMEs or the suppliers? 
 How do you ensure that the names of the directors of an EME do not crop up again 
during the rotation process? 
 How do you confirm whether the EMEs are tax compliant? 
 
   
 
When participant SCM1 was asked how he/she rotates the EMEs, he/she stated that he/she 
does not follow any process to ensure that an EME is not selected twice to the disadvantage 
of the other EMEs. 
 
Participant SCM2 concurred with participant SCM1 that the process to follow when rotating the 
EMEs was still a challenge at SASSA  “At the moment there is no specific process to follow 
when rotating the EMEs ” He further stated that “millions and millions” of suppliers register or 
appear on the CSD system on a daily basis.  
 
Participant SCM2 supported his argument by stating the following: In the SCM department it is 
the norm to select about 8 or 10 suppliers per commodity per request. If the same request is 
made in the next week or the next month when an SCM practitioner logs in to the database, 
he/she will not know that previous search ended with supplier X and so will continue from 
there, “so it is like chasing a moving target that you do not have control over”  
 
Participants SCM1 and SCM2 were also asked the following question: How do you ensure that 
the names of the directors of an EME do not crop up again during the rotation process?  
 
Participant SCM1 responded that every time that a practitioner nominates a supplier he/she 
gets a CSD report containing all the necessary information about the company, namely the 
company‟s name, registration number, tax number and banking details, so now they rely more 
on the CSD report than previously, when they had their own internal database. 
 
Participant SCM2 stated that it is impossible to check on the system whether a director is 
being repeated and supported this statement as follows:  
 
That is why I‟m saying is not like a normal database where you will have say     
people, 100 suppliers and you start with the first 10, next time you start from 11 to 
whatever 20 or 21 then just like that up to 100, then you start from scratch again, in 
this case as I‟m saying every time like we sitting now people are registering for the 
same commodities and then if the registration is successful today that EME or that 
supplier might be picked up the following day and have an opportunity to do RFQs 
whereas the other one maybe has registered three month ago that person 
somewhere somehow whatever reason the person find is not even been given the 
opportunity to do RFQs, so it‟s a serious gab  And when we ask Treasury, they will 
tell you that this is not a supplier database, it‟s a listing of suppliers but we are forced 
   
 
to work through that and we cannot close the listing in our database because once 
we have done the selection, the supplier who has been registered is being migrated 
now into our supplier database now for us to be able to issue orders and be able to 
process payment, and it forms part of what we call SASSA Oracle database. 
 
When asked, What process do you follow to ensure tax compliance?,  
 
participant SCM  highlighted the fact that there are two ways of confirming the supplier‟s tax 
compliance:  
 
The first method is that the SCM practitioner requests a supplier to submit a verification PIN 
used when calling SARS to confirm whether that supplier is tax-compliant or not. SARS then 
gives the practitioner a reference number stating whether the supplier is compliant or not, and 
that number is written down by the practitioner on top of the verification.  
 
The second method for confirming tax compliance is through the central database system 
(CDS). Participant SCM1 further stated that his/her unit makes use of the CSD and SARS, 
because of the real-time interface between those two, meaning that the record of an EME at 
SARS on a particular day is exactly the same as the record on the report extracted from the 
CSD system on the same day. If there is no tax compliance, it is stated on the CSD report 
under “tax information”   
 
Participant SCM3 concurred with participant SCM1 that SASSA fully relies on the CSD system 
for verifying the tax status of an EME and described the process normally followed, namely: 
 
 First, the authorised SCM practitioner checks on the CSD whether the EME is tax-
compliant or not  A report indicating the EME‟s tax status is then printed and filed under 
the name of that particular EME.  
 Secondly, the SCM practitioner further confirms the EME‟s tax status by phoning the 
SARS hotline giving the company‟s registration number and tax number to ensure that 
the document provided during the bidding or the request-for-quotation (RFQ) process is 
correct.  
 Lastly, if the procurement took place through a bidding process, the SCM practitioner, for 
the verification process that follows, should have written down the reference number 
provided by SARS on the tax-clearance certificate of the prospective EME. Upon request 
by the practitioner, SARS then confirms the EME‟s tax status and provides a reference 
   
 
code confirming it. If the verification takes place per RFQ, the SCM practitioner should 
write down the reference code on top of the CSD report to indicate that the EME‟s status 
was confirmed by SARS. 
 
Apart from the controls within SASSA‟s SCM processes discussed above, there are other 
controls introduced by SASSA‟s executive management to help curb fraud and corruption 
activities within SASSA. These controls include the fraud-prevention strategy and the risk-
management processes, both discussed below. 
 
F. Strategy for dealing with fraud and corruption activities 
 
The fraud-prevention strategy document (SASSA     c , approved by SASSA‟s CEO on    
April 2015 (SASSA 2015c:26), gives a detailed outline of what action should be taken to 
prevent and detect activities of fraud and corruption, said to include the following: (SASSA 
2015c:7): 
 
o any act of dishonesty 
o theft of funds, supplies or assets 
o relationships constituting a conflict of interest between suppliers and employees 
o unlawful gratuities 
o kickbacks and bribery 
o embezzlement 
o nepotism 
o extortion 
o making profit using inside knowledge 
o disclosing proprietary information to outside parties for a financial or other advantage 
o falsification and forgery 
o overstatement of income in order to conceal unauthorised transactions 
o understatement of liabilities and expenses in order to conceal illegal transactions 
o false and/or omitted disclosure 
 
The purpose of analysing the fraud-prevention-strategy document was to establish whether 
possible tax evasion was a prioritised risk as far as SASSA‟s fraud and corruption unit was 
concerned, and the analysis revealed that tax evasion was not a priority there. 
 
   
 
Tax evasion was indirectly covered in the above-mentioned list. The literature review revealed 
that the element common to fraud, tax evasion and corruption is “dishonesty” (Arnaldo     ; 
Swanepoel        However, SASSA‟s fraud and corruption unit has been limiting itself to fraud 
and corruption activities relating to grants and has not paid any attention at all to tax evasion.  
 
On 25 April 2017, participant FCI5, senior official in the fraud and corruption unit, was asked 
the following question to establish whether possible tax evasion was covered in SASSA‟s 
fraud and corruption strategy and to support the document analysis presented above: 
 
    What is the role of the fraud and corruption unit within SASSA’s SCM processes? 
 What is your unit’s priority when developing a fraud and corruption strategy? 
 Why is dealing with possible tax evasion not a prioritised strategy? 
 What risks have your unit identified relating to fraud and corruption on the one hand, and 
tax evasion on the other? 
 How does your unit deal with fraud and corruption activities within SASSA’s SCM 
processes when discovered? 
 
When asked about the role of the fraud and corruption unit, participant FCI5 stated that its role 
within SASSA is to detect and investigate suspicions transactions. 
 
When asked, Why is dealing with possible tax evasion not a prioritised strategy?, participant 
FCI5 was not clear on this point, but when asked, What was your unit’s priority when 
developing the fraud and corruption strategy?, he/she stated that their priority was to look at 
the core function of SASSA, which is paying out social grants to beneficiaries. 
 
When asked, What risks has your unit identified relating to fraud and corruption on the one 
hand, and tax evasion on the other?, the participant highlighted the risk of corruption during 
the selection process, especially when the service to be procured is less than R500 000. To 
the question, How does your unit deal with fraud and corruption activities when discovered?, 
the participant said that cases needing disciplinary action were dealt with within SASSA‟s 
policies, and cases involving EMEs were normally reported to the SAPS for investigation and 
prosecution. 
 
  
   
 
G. Risk-management processes 
 
The risk-management-strategy document was developed by SASSA‟s executive management 
and approved by SASSA‟s CEO on    November       It was implemented across SASSA 
from the date of approval (SASSA 2015e:27). The  document outlines how risk management 
should be conducted within SASSA to ensure that risks identified are assessed, ranked, 
prioritised and managed in an effective manner (SASSA 2015e:6). 
 
The above-mentioned document was analysed to establish whether any risks relating to 
possible tax evasion within the SCM value chain were identified by the risk management unit, 
and what the mitigating strategy was. 
 
From analysing the document it transpired that the risk of possible tax evasion was not 
captured anywhere in the document and that some of SASSA‟s members of staff were not 
even aware that this document existed. 
 
On 2 May 2017, participant RAS7, senior official in the risk management unit, was asked the 
following questions to establish whether possible tax evasion was covered in SASSA‟s risk- 
management processes, and to support the document analysis presented above. 
 
 What is the role of the risk-assessment unit within SASSA’s SCM processes? 
 What risks relating to possible tax evasion have your unit identified as a unit within the 
SCM value chain? 
 What mitigating strategy has your unit recommended or implemented to minimise 
possible tax evasion or fraud and corruption within the SCM processes? 
 How successful has your unit been in mitigating the risks of fraud and corruption 
activities relating to the SCM processes? 
 How successful has your unit been in mitigating the risks regarding the recovery of funds 
lost because of fraud and corruption activities relating to the SCM processes? 
 
When asked about the role of the risk-management unit within SASSA and how often risk 
assessment should be implemented, participant RAS7 said that the role of his/her unit was to 
manage in accordance with the Public Sector Risk Management Framework (PSRMF) and to 
do a risk assessment on a regular basis.  
 
   
 
Participant RAS7 also said that SASSA had been unable to do a risk assessment on a regular 
basis as it was supposed to do due to the risk-management unit not having enough human 
resources. The participant further argued that despite that challenge, tax evasion was not their 
priority, and no mitigating strategies had been developed because of tax evasion falling 
outside the mandate of the unit.  
 
When participant RAS7 was asked about mitigating the risks of fraud and corruption activities 
relating to the SCM processes, he/she said that such risks were the responsibility of the fraud 
and corruption unit. 
 
Participant FCI5 however argued that the fraud and corruption unit was responsible for fraud 
emanating from the core business of SASSA, which was paying out social grants to 
beneficiaries, and not paying EMEs for services rendered or goods supplied.   
 
Participant RAS7 was asked how successful they had been in mitigating the risk of not 
recovering funds lost because of fraud and corruption, particularly losses in the SCM 
department. The participant said that they did not know how this was handled, because they 
had never been involved in the process and did not know anything about recoveries resulting 
in a mitigation strategy.   
 
Below follows a discussion of the document analysis and of the interview responses about 
how the inconsistent implementation of internal controls within SASSA‟s SCM processes leads 
to possible tax evasion. 
 
4.3.2 Inconsistent implementation of the existing internal controls 
 
SASSA‟s executive management in their annual reports (ie, comprehensive reports developed 
once a year on all SASSA‟s activities throughout the previous year  raised concerns about 
SASSA‟s inconsistent implementation of the internal controls  The annual reports for the past 
five financial years were analysed to assess as to what extent the SCM internal controls had 
been implemented.  
 
A. Irregular expenditure  
 
An analysis of SASSA‟s annual report of 2015/16 revealed that SASSA had not been 
implementing the SCM processes, policies and legislation in a consistent manner and that 
   
 
their non-compliance with the SCM internal controls had led to a high level of irregular 
expenditure (SASSA 2016a). As confirmed by the auditor general‟s     /   report (Auditor 
General         , “irregular expenditure” is an indicator of a significant breakdown in internal 
controls. 
 
Below follows figure 9, developed from a note to the annual financial statements, depicting 
the increase in irregular expenditure (SASSA          ,          , 2015a, 2016a):  
 
Figure 9: Status of SASSA’s irregular expenditure as at 31 March 2016   
    
(Fig  : Compiled by the researcher from SASSA 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016a.) 
 
As shown in figure 9 above, between    March      and    March     , SASSA‟s irregular 
expenditure increased from 10 million to 1 billion rand, that is by over 9 900%, clearly 
indicating  that SASSA‟s staff was not adhering to the procurement and SCM policies. This 
could result in possible tax evasion and eventually a loss to the fiscus, because SASSA‟s 
SCM policy inter alia requires that for a supplier to be awarded a contract, it must submit a 
valid tax-clearance certificate confirming its tax status (SASSA 2016b).  
 
SASSA reviewed both the findings of its internal-audit unit and the report of the auditor general 
for the financial year 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015. The review was based on the risk 
assessment conducted by SASSA‟s internal-audit unit and revealed certain weaknesses in 
SASSA‟s internal controls (SASSA     a      
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According to the above-mentioned annual report (SASSA     a , SASSA‟s executive 
management was concerned about the following areas of risk identified by the auditor general 
and SASSA‟s internal audit  
 
    The internal-control system was not as effective as it should be because of a very high 
level of non-compliance with the SCM regulations. 
 Critical documents such as tax-clearance and BEE certificates were missing and 
incomplete. 
 Despite it being its task to effectively deal with cases of irregular expenditure, SASSA‟s 
Financial Misconduct Board (FMB) failed to be effective in this respect. 
 
Participant INM4, a senior official in the internal-control unit, during the interview with him/her 
on 25 April 2017 was asked the following questions regarding the concerns raised by 
SASSA‟s executive management in SASSA‟s annual report for     /     
 
 What is the mandate of the internal-control unit within SASSA’s SCM processes? 
 How successful is SASSA in implementing the existing SCM internal controls? 
 What are the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls? 
 
 
The internal-control unit is the most critical unit in SASSA‟s SCM value chain as far as the 
implementation of SCM policies, processes and procedures is concerned. According to 
participant INM4, it is the role of the internal-control unit to monitor the implementation of 
financial legislation, identify policy loopholes within the SCM processes, investigate cases of 
financial misconduct resulting in irregular, “fruitless and wasteful expenditure” (see “definitions 
of concepts” above , and also help SCM units to respond to the audit findings of the auditor 
general. 
 
When participant INM4 was asked how successful SASSA was in implementing the existing 
SCM internal controls, he/she stated that SASSA‟s existing internal controls were not 
implemented in an effective and consistent manner. The participant highlighted the fact that 
the number of cases of financial misconduct relating to irregular, “fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure” served as an indication that there were deficiencies in the implementation of 
these controls (see fig 9 above).  
 
   
 
An example given here by the participant was a case where instead of the three quotations 
required, an SCM practitioner requested one quotation from only one supplier, thus increasing 
the risk of fraud and corruption within the SCM processes. The official was not disciplined for 
this transgression.   
 
When asked about the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls, the 
participant stated that the fiscus would take the strain because of the contract having been 
awarded to a supplier that was not tax-compliant. It could further result in an irregular, 
“fruitless and wasteful expenditure”   
 
Participant INA6 concurred with participant INM4 that SASSA had a great deal of irregular and 
fruitless expenditure that could have been avoided if more effort was made to ensure that 
everyone complied with the SCM policies, processes and procedures. As a result, every year, 
for the past three years, the auditor general found SASSA to have irregular, “fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure”   
 
Participant INA6 concurred with participant INM4 that one of the consequences of not 
complying with SCM policies and procedures was fraud and corruption. 
 
B. Regular reviewing of risk assessment and internal controls  
 
To the researcher‟s question as to how often risk assessment should be performed, participant 
RAS7 stated that although SASSA was supposed to do risk assessment on a regular basis, it 
could not have done so because of the risk-management unit not having enough human 
resources.  
 
When asked about the risks of not performing risk assessment, participant RAS7 argued that 
without regular risk assessment SASSA would not be able to identify relevant and high risks 
on time , and also that risk assessment is important to help SASSA make sure that they cover 
all the risks, especially high risks, within the organisational processes. Therefore, without risk 
assessment SASSA runs the risk of not managing its highest risk, which could include 
possible tax evasion, fraud and corruption. It was suggested by the participant that SASSA do 
risk assessment on a regular basis so that the highest risks are identified and attended to. 
 
During the interview on 25 April 2017, the senior official in the internal-control unit, participant 
INM4, was also asked the following questions: 
   
 
 
 How often does your unit review the SCM internal controls? 
 How successful has your unit been in reviewing the internal controls on an annual basis, 
and what have been the challenges?  
 Why have the internal controls not been implemented in an effective manner? 
 
SASSA‟s policies require internal controls to be reviewed on a regular basis  When asked how 
often the SCM internal controls were reviewed, participant INM4, the most senior official in the 
internal-control unit, stated that SASSA had no time lines for reviewing the internal controls, 
because of the unit not having enough human resources to do so on a regular basis.  
 
When asked why the SCM practitioners did not implement the internal controls in an effective 
and consistent manner, participant INM4 stated that it could be because of the following 
reasons:  
 
 SASSA‟s SCM practitioners were appointed without a knowledge of and skills for the 
procurement processes, including the tax-compliance processes. 
 Newly-appointed SCM practitioners did not undergo an induction process. 
 Management did not monitor the SCM practitioners to ensure that the SCM policies, 
processes and procedures (eg, the SCM delegation regarding financial matters and the 
SCM policy), were implemented. 
 There was no clear segregation of duties. 
 
C. Fraud and corruption  
 
Participants SCM1, SCM2 and SCM3 were asked the following question: What could be the 
reasons for not adhering to the SCM processes?  
 
Participant SCM1 stated that sometimes these processes were deliberately not adhered to 
because of an intention to commit fraud and corruption. Participant SCM3 added that it 
happened when SCM practitioners wished to collude in order to commit fraud and suppliers 
wished to avoid paying tax.  
 
When asked, What could be the reasons for SCM practitioners, or any other SASSA officials, 
not adhering to the SCM processes, participant SCM2 stated that sometimes it would happen 
   
 
because of ignorance, but it could also be a practitioner or any SASSA member of staff 
wishing to bypass the SCM processes.  
 
Fraud and corruption in government procurement was also brought to the fore when the chief 
procurement officer (CPO) in an interview with City Press indicated that the biggest sources of 
corruption and waste read about in the newspapers were not tenders amounting to R50 
million, but the millions of small routeing transactions happening every day and making up to 
97% of all transactions – a million small opportunities for vast corruption (Van Rensburg: 
      -    
 
D. Limited scope for dealing with possible tax evasion 
 
Participant INM4 was asked the following question: 
 
 What internal controls relating to possible tax evasion have your unit been implementing 
in the SCM processes? 
 
The participant stated that although they were currently using the CSD system for verifying the 
tax compliance of EMEs contracting with SASSA, he/she had reservations about the system, 
because although it could confirm the tax-compliance status of a particular EME, it did not 
mean that the EME had given SARS a true picture of its income. The participant further 
mentioned that more needed to be done to verify the compliance status of EMEs contracting 
with SASSA.  
 
On 26 April 2017, participant INA6, the senior official in the internal-control unit, was asked the 
questions below to establish whether the auditing process of SASSA‟s SCM internal controls 
covered the risk of possible tax evasion. These questions could be used to support the above-
mentioned document analysis and interviews with the other participants. 
 
 What mandate does the internal-audit unit have as far as SASSA’s SCM processes are 
concerned? 
 What were your unit’s findings regarding the effectiveness of the SCM internal controls 
and the consistency with which the controls were implemented, and what were the 
recommendations? 
 What were your unit’s findings regarding controls relating to possible tax evasion, and 
what were the recommendations? 
   
 
 How successful has SASSA been in recovering funds lost because of fraud and 
corruption activities in SASSA, particularly losses within the supply-chain processes? 
 
The internal audit takes place at the end of all the SASSA processes. According to participant 
INA6, it is the role of the internal-audit unit to evaluate the system of internal controls 
implemented in order to check whether the system is adequate, effective and efficient. If the 
system is found to be inadequate, inefficient or ineffective, corrective measures will be 
recommended.  
 
The aforementioned process is normally done on an annual basis, because there are so many 
cases of fraud and corruption in the SCM units. Below are the steps followed by the internal-
audit unit in evaluating the SCM processes: 
 
 Request for auditing the flow of the SCM department‟s business processes.  
 Test whether the SCM department does indeed follow the business processes 
presented. 
 Do a risk analysis of the business processes to check whether there are risks in the 
processes.  
 If there are risks, select a sample of transactions to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency 
and adequacy of the controls available for mitigating those risks.  
 
 When asked, What were your unit’s findings regarding the effectiveness of the SCM 
internal controls and the consistency with which the controls were implemented, and 
what were the recommendations?, participant INA6 said the following:  
 
In most instances, the controls are adequate, but they are not effective and 
efficient because of one abuse of authority, namely where we find that the 
senior officials will actually force junior officials to process transactions 
knowing very well that those transactions are fraudulent, so as a result the 
control that is in place will not be functioning as it is supposed to, even 
though it is adequate to prevent corruption activities from happening. One 
other thing is collusion, where you find that an official within the SCM 
processes and one within the payment processes are actually working with 
the service provider, then what they will do, they will take the amount that is 
supposed to be claimed by the service provider and then maybe they will 
   
 
double the amount, the official will sign the goods received voucher (GRV) to 
indicate they have received the services, whereas we know that the services 
were not received. At the end of the day, those officials will then go and 
maybe share the money. It has been tested several times, and it was found 
that there were orders within our supply chain that were cancelled after the 
payment had gone through the bank, so in such an instance only a person 
who understands the internal processes is able to do that. Somebody who 
does not understand these processes will not be able to do that, so the 
controls are there, but it‟s the human factor that is making the controls not to 
be effective.    
 
However, participant INA6 also highlighted that although the internal-audit unit had never been 
assigned to audit possible tax evasion, sometimes, during the auditing process, they tested 
the amount of tax against the amount of VAT charged by the supplier. Therefore, auditing for 
possible tax evasion within the SCM processes does not form part of the duties of SASSA‟s 
internal-audit unit.  
 
When asked how successful SASSA was in implementing the existing SCM internal controls, 
participant INA  stated that SASSA‟s controls were adequate -- the challenge being that the 
controls were just not implemented in an adequate manner. According to the participant, any 
transgressions were deliberate, because the officials involved knew that any wrongdoings 
within SASSA‟s SCM processes would not have any consequences  
  
4.4. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES 
 
Below follows a discussion of any suggestions by the participants on how to make the SCM 
internal controls more effective (see sect       below), and the implementation of these 
controls more consistent (see sect       below). 
 
4.4.1 Improving the effectiveness of the existing internal controls 
 
With a view to improving the effectiveness of the SCM internal controls, the participants were 
asked the following questions: 
 
 What would you suggest must be done to minimise possible tax evasion within the 
SASSA SCM processes?  
   
 
 What would you suggest that SASSA do to improve the tax compliance of EMEs in order 
to minimise possible tax evasion within the SCM processes? 
 
Participant SCM1 suggested that relying on the service provider to supply the correct 
information was not an appropriate option – SASSA‟s SCM internal controls must be sound  
The participant also made the following suggestions: 
 
SASSA‟s systems must interface with Treasury systems like the CSD system so that 
when an order is issued to a service provider, the amount of that particular order 
must appear on the system of both the Treasury and SARS until it is time for tax 
assessment. This will help guard against the possibility of non-disclosure by the 
service provider. 
 
The SCM interface process should be like the one used by SASSA for taxing their 
employees: the money is deducted from the salaries of the employees and is 
automatically paid to SARS. Every supplier doing business with SASSA should have 
a profile with SARS, and the amount of tax on whatever money SASSA pays them 
should be automatically calculated and paid to SARS or should reflect with SARS so 
that at the end of the financial year SARS will be able to verify that what was 
declared is the same as what is on our system, then in that way we can deal with tax 
evasion within the SCM systems.  
 
According to participant SCM3, SASSA must stop relying solely on SARS when it comes to 
measures dealing with non-tax compliance. SASSA must develop its own controls regarding 
the tax compliance of EMEs contracting with the Agency.  
 
The above suggestion would support the strategic shift proposed by SARS in its strategic plan 
for 2014/15, namely to move from an isolated-department view to a whole-of-government view 
in dealing with the issues of non-compliance and the eradication of tax evasion (SARS 2015a).  
 
According to participant SCM2, much could still be done to minimise the risk of possible tax 
evasion within the SCM processes, namely: 
 
SASSA needs to look again at the process of appointing EMEs for providing services or 
goods to the Agency, SASSA needs to educate both the public and the SCM 
   
 
practitioners dealing with procurement on a daily basis to make sure that they 
understand the SARS and the CSD processes for checking for tax compliance.  
 
Participant FCI5, a senior official in the fraud and corruption unit, would like to see 
changes in the selection of EMEs at the quotation stage. The participant further 
suggested that the selection process be done electronically using the CSD system, 
until an EME is appointed. The process should not be done manually by the SCM 
practitioners, because that increases the risk of collusion between SASSA‟s SCM 
practitioners and the EMEs. 
 
4.4.2 Improving of consistency in implementing the existing internal controls 
 
Below are the questions asked to establish what solutions the participants could suggest for 
implementing the SCM internal controls in a more consistent manner: 
 
What improvements, if any, can be recommended 
 
 To improve SASSA’s risk assessment regarding possible tax evasion within the SCM 
processes?  
 To improve the effectiveness of SASSA’s SCM internal controls regarding possible tax 
evasion?  
 To ensure that SASSA implements its internal controls in an effective and consistent 
manner?   
 To ensure that EMEs contracting with SASSA comply with all SCM processes in a true 
and honest manner in order to minimise possible tax evasion? 
 
Participant RAS7, a senior official risk-management unit, suggested that for SASSA to 
minimise the risk of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes, there must be change in 
tone from the top: 
 
Currently, we at SASSA have problems with the tone at the top. If our executives 
and our heads were to take risk management seriously, and not as a nice-to-have 
kind of a thing, we would not be having such problems? 
 
   
 
According to participant RAS7, ever since he/she started working at SASSA, it was his/her 
observation that risk management was never discussed in SASSA‟s executive committee 
(Exco) and branch meetings -- only in audit-committee and risk-committee meetings.  
 
The participant further argued that risk management needed to be discussed in important 
meetings, especially Exco meetings, so that the executives could take the matter seriously: 
 
If it is not taken seriously at the top, obviously the rest of the staff also won‟t take it 
seriously.  
 
Participant RAS7 thus agreed with Fourie and Ackermann (2013) that the attitude of the 
executive management is critical. Internal controls can be effective only if the executives take 
the matter seriously, so that all the other employees can  do likewise. 
 
Participants INM4, INA6 and RAS7 suggested that the following  be done to make the internal 
controls more effective and to implement those controls in a more consistent manner in order 
to minimise possible tax evasion within the SCM processes: 
 
 SASSA‟s reporting lines should be looked at again, because, according to RAS7, the 
risk-management unit should report directly to the chief executive officer (CEO) or the 
chief operations officer (COO), and to nobody in a position below that. 
 The risk-management process should be a standing agenda item of Exco meetings. 
 Risk, “fraud and corruption” and internal auditing should be managed from the CEO‟s 
office. 
 SASSA should promote professional development through regular training so that both 
the SCM practitioners and SASSA‟s management are kept up to date on the SCM 
policies and Treasury directives.  
 SASSA‟s continuous professional development should include tax policies and 
legislation.  
 SASSA should be able to go beyond the CSD in verifying the tax compliance of EMEs to 
ensure that what has been declared to SARS is indeed correct. 
 Internal controls should be reviewed on an annual basis. 
 All EMEs  tendering for goods or services for over R1 million should be registered for 
VAT.  
 The risk-management unit should be able to do a risk analysis of possible tax evasion in 
the SCM processes. 
   
 
 Once a risk has been identified, the matter should be referred to the internal-audit unit for 
testing whether the processes in place will be able to address the risk. After testing, the 
matter should be handed over to the fraud and corruption unit for investigating how it 
happened and how it can be prevented. 
 ln cases of possible tax evasion stemming from a collusion between SASSA staff and 
EMEs, consequence management should be implemented. 
 New policies or Treasury directives should be communicated in an effective manner.  
 SARS, SASSA, the CIPC and other government departments should interface with one 
another. 
 SASSA members of staff should be subjected to life-style audits to check whether any of 
them are doing business with SASSA and other government departments, and whether 
any kickbacks have been deposited into their accounts. 
 Government should start educating EMEs about government processes and the 
consequences of any non-compliance, such as tax fines and penalties. 
 Blacklisting of EMEs found to have been involved in fraud and corruption activities, 
including tax evasion, should be intensified. 
 
The suggestions of the participants in this study presented in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 above 
are supported by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO), which stated that any effective internal-control system in any organisation should 
have the following characteristics (Fourie & Ackermann      :  
 
   Control environment –  It is critical for the executive management to take the internal 
controls seriously and to strive to make them effective, and not to change these 
controls as and when they please. If the executive management is not seen to be 
interested in enforcing the internal controls in place, the entire organisation will be that 
way inclined, meaning that although an organisation may have good and sound internal 
controls, these controls will never be implemented, or some will be implemented and 
some not. 
 
 Risk assessment – An organisation should assess what could go wrong in the 
organisation on a regular basis so that a strategy may be developed far in advance, 
before something unfortunate happens to that organisation. 
 
   
 
 Information and communication – Effective information and communication would 
require an organisation to have good and sound business systems that would help the 
organisation to gather credible information about the internal controls and the 
management that uses this information to support employees in doing their work. 
 
 Monitoring activities – Effective monitoring requires an organisation to test existing 
control activities and procedures on an on-going basis in order to identify weaknesses, 
and to be able to determine mechanisms that must be followed when there is a change 
in the business processes. 
 
 Control activities – It is very critical for any organisation to develop specific activities 
that must be performed by its personnel to ensure that the internal controls are effective. 
 
4.5. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 
Throughout the presentation and the analysis of the data in this chapter, it was clear that most 
of the participants were in agreement that SASSA‟s SCM internal controls designed for 
minimising the risk of possible tax evasion were not effective and were not implemented in a 
consistent manner. This argument was supported by the documents presented and analysed 
in this chapter.  
 
First, most participants suggested that possible tax evasion should be incorporated as a risk in 
the risk-assessment processes within SASSA‟s SCM processes. Secondly, the participants 
suggested that the CSD tax-compliance processes be reviewed, because there was no clear 
control for managing the rotation of EMEs during the selection process in order to guard 
against the possibility of non-tax-compliant EMEs contracting with SASSA. Lastly, the 
participants suggested that SASSA capacitate its SCM practitioners with regards to tax-related 
matters in order to improve effectiveness as far as possible tax evasion and the consistent 
implementation of the SCM internal controls were concerned.  
 
The next chapter contains the findings of this study, the recommendations, suggestions for 
future research. and also the conclusion of this study.     
 
 
 
  
   
 
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMANDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the main findings of the study and makes recommendations for, and 
provides possible solutions to, the findings identified. 
 
5.2. FINDINGS 
 
5.2.1 Ineffectiveness of existing internal controls 
The ineffectiveness of SASSA‟s existing SCM internal controls results in possible tax evasion, 
due to the following: 
 
 The lack of a rotation process in SASSA‟s SCM processes for minimising the possibility 
of awarding a contract to the same directors, but different EMEs. Directors can register a 
company anytime that they wish to secure a tender contract with any organ of state. At 
SARS, a new company is deemed to be tax compliant, because in such a case, no 
declaration is required of income earned. Therefore, a tax-clearance certificate is issued 
immediately, on the same day that the company is registered. 
 The SCM practitioners having no knowledge and understanding of either SARS‟s 
processes or the tax-compliance processes.   
 A dependency on SARS for developing controls for dealing with tax compliance and 
possible tax evasion. 
 Ineffective communication and timing on the part of the National Treasury as far as 
changes in the SCM policies, processes and procedures are concerned. 
 SCM practitioners‟ lack of understanding of the SCM policies, processes and 
procedures. 
 The possibility of EMEs providing SASSA‟s SCM practitioners with false information in 
order to secure contracts.  
 The possibility of an EME colluding with a SARS official to issue it a tax- clearance 
certificate without being in good standing with regard to tax matters. 
 The possibility of EMEs colluding with SASSA‟s SCM practitioners to select an EME of 
their choice, even without that EME being tax-compliant. 
 The possibility of EMEs paying kickback and bribery money to SASSA‟s SCM practitio-
ners that will never be declared as income to SARS.  
   
 
 EMEs being liquated upon the realisation of an investigation. 
 A lack of cooperation from the perpetrators of fraud and corruption. 
 Not having enough resources for recovering funds lost due to fraud and corruption 
activities. 
 Seniors pressurising junior staff to bypass the SCM processes. 
 SASSA‟s SCM processes, risk-management strategy and fraud-prevention strategy not 
taking tax evasion into account.   
 
 
5.2.2 Inconsistent implementation of internal controls 
 
The inconsistent implementation of SASSA‟s existing SCM internal controls results in possible 
tax evasion due to the following: 
 
 Ignorance and a deliberate bypassing of SCM legislation and policies, resulting in 
irregular expenditure, and eventually in loss to the fiscus. 
 The internal-control unit not having enough human resources. 
 A lack of skills among internal-control unit staff. 
 Management not being accountable and responsible for holding SCM practitioners 
accountable for mistakes made, or for not applying consequence management. 
 SCM practitioners‟ lack of knowledge and skills as far as the procurement processes, 
including the tax-compliance process, are concerned. 
 There being no induction process for newly-appointed SCM practitioners. 
 Management‟s lack of monitoring the SCM practitioners to ensure that the SCM policies, 
processes and procedures (such as delegation with regard to financial matters) are 
implemented.  
 There is no clear segregation of duties. 
 A lack of regular risk assessment and internal controls. 
 Tax evasion not being on SASSA‟s list of priorities.  
 Some respondents‟ lack of understanding of the role played by the different units within 
the SCM value chain and the money lost by SASSA due to fraud and corruption. 
 An unwillingness of top management to take risk management seriously. 
 The internal-audit unit having no way of testing for possible tax evasion. 
 
  
   
 
5.3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.3.1 Conclusion 
The aim of the study was to investigate and examine the effectiveness and implementation of 
the existing internal controls designed specifically for EMEs contracting with SASSA in order 
to minimise the risk of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes. A literature review was 
done to identify the general risk factors contributing to possible tax evasion and the mitigation 
strategies that could be implemented to minimise it in the SCM processes.   
 
The research was followed by a document review and face-to-face interviews with SCM 
practitioners, the risk manager, the fraud and corruption manager, the internal-control 
manager and the internal auditor in order to gain an understanding of SASSA‟s SCM internal 
controls designed for EMEs contracting with SASSA and identify the risk of possible tax 
evasion within the processes.  
 
The data and the analysis of both the interviews and the document review were presented in 
chapter 4, and the findings, conclusion and recommendations in chapter 5. During the 
analysis, three main themes were identified: first, SASSA‟s sources of revenue and 
procurement, secondly, factors contributing to possible tax evasion within the SCM processes, 
and lastly, suggestions by the participants for minimising possible tax evasion. The findings 
regarding these themes were presented in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above. 
 
It was concluded that there is a risk of possible tax evasion within the SCM processes due to 
the ineffective and inconsistent implementation of internal controls designed for EMEs 
contracting with SASSA. This risk could be minimised by incorporating possible anti-tax-
evasion procedures in the risk- assessment process, and ultimately in SASSA‟s broader fraud 
and corruption strategies. Doing so should minimise the funds lost to the fiscus due to tax 
evasion in the SCM processes.  
 
5.3.2 Recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the existing internal 
controls 
 
SASSA should do the following: 
 
 Develop a strategy for verifying (ie improve the current database to interface real-time 
with CIPC systems) the rotation of EMEs and their directors so that the same directors 
   
 
and/or the same EMEs do not have an advantage over the others in order to minimise 
the possibility of awarding a contract to the same directors and/or EMEs again and 
again. 
 Develop a training strategy for giving SASSA‟s SCM practitioners the necessary 
knowledge and understanding of SARS‟s processes, and of tax evasion  
 Be proactive and develop its own internal controls for dealing with tax compliance and 
possible tax evasion instead of depending on SARS and the National Treasury. 
 Improve the communication process, so that when the National Treasury introduces 
changes in the SCM policies, processes and procedures, everyone is aware of them. 
 Introduce continuous development programmes for improving the SCM practitioners‟ 
understanding of the SCM policies, processes and procedures.  
 Develop an integrated, comprehensive fraud and corruption and risk-management 
strategy, including a strategy for dealing with the following:  
o Possibility of tax evasion within the SCM processes.  
o Possibility of an EME colluding with a SARS official to issue it a tax- clearance 
certificate without being in good standing with regard to its tax affairs.  
o Possibility of EMEs colluding with SASSA‟s SCM practitioners to select an EME of 
their choice, even without that EME being tax-compliant. 
o Possibility of EMEs paying kickback and bribery money to SASSA‟s SCM 
practitioners that could possibly not be declared as income to SARS. 
 Allocate more resources to help recover funds lost because of fraud and corruption 
activities, including tax evasion. 
 Teach the junior staff of the SCM department not to succumb to pressure from the senior 
staff to bypass the SCM processes. 
 Introduce the IT3 return for all EMEs contracting with SASSA. 
 
5.3.3 Recommendations for making the implementation of internal controls more 
consistent 
 
SASSA should do the following: 
 
 Provide more human resources to the internal-control unit. 
 Capacitate the current internal-control staff in terms of skills and knowledge, including 
tax-compliance issues and tax evasion. 
   
 
 Introduce a strategy for improving management‟s accountability and responsibility for 
holding SCM practitioners accountable for mistakes made, or for not applying 
consequence management. 
 Implement an induction process (including information about SARS-compliance issues 
and tax evasion) for newly-appointed SCM practitioners. 
 Improve management‟s monitoring of SCM practitioners regarding the implementation of 
SCM policies, processes and procedures.  
 Develop a clear segregation of duties. 
 Develop clear roles and responsibilities within the SCM processes. 
 Do risk assessment and review internal controls on a regular basis. 
 List possible tax evasion as one of SASSA‟s top priorities. 
 Educate all SASSA‟s members of staff about the activities of other SASSA units. 
 Sensitise top management to take risk management seriously by making risk 
management and internal controls a standing agenda item of Exco meetings. 
 Develop a methodology for testing for possible tax evasion by the internal-audit unit.  
 
 
5.3.4 Suggestions for future research 
 
Research regarding EMEs declaring a zero or a reduced income when completing and 
submitting tax-related returns after contracting with the state during the year of assessment; 
investigating the impact of tax evasion by EMEs on the total revenue of the country. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Head Office SCM Demand and Acquisition practitioners (Participant SCM1 and SCM2): 
1. What process do you follow when selecting or nominating an EME to provide services or goods 
to SASSA?  
2. What documents do you handle during this process?  
3. What criteria do you follow when rotating an EME during the selection process?  
4. How do you ensure the directors of an EME are not the same persons during the rotation 
process?  
5. What process do you follow to confirm tax compliance by the EMEs?  
6. What could be the reasons for not adhering to the SCM processes?  
7. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA? 
8. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
9. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
10.  How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
11. What would you suggest must be done to minimise possible tax evasion within the SASSA SCM 
Process? 
 
Head Office SCM compliance practitioner (Participant SCM3): 
 
1. What is the role of the compliance unit within the SCM processes? 
2. What documents do you require during the process? 
3. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”?  
4. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
5. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA? 
6. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue?  
7. What process do you follow to confirm tax compliance by the EMEs?  
8. What proof does SARS provide to confirm the tax compliance? 
9. How do you ensure the directors of EMEs are not the same persons during the rotation process?  
10. What could be the reasons for not adhering to SCM processes by SCM practitioners or any other 
SASSA official?  
11. What would you suggest could be done by SASSA to improve tax compliance by EMEs within 
the SCM processes to minimise possible tax evasion? 
 
Head Office Internal Control Manager (Participant INM4): 
 
1. What is your mandate as internal control unit within SASSA SCM processes?  
2. How often do you review the SCM internal controls?  
3. How have been doing in terms of reviewing the internal controls annually, and what has been the 
challenges?  
4. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA? 
5. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
6. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
7. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue?  
8. What internal controls relating to possible tax evasion, have you implemented in SASSA‟s SCM 
processes?  
9. How successful is SASSA in terms of implementing the existing SCM internal controls?  
10. What causes the internal controls not to be implemented effectively and consistently by the SCM 
practitioners?  
11. What are the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls?  
12. What would you suggest to improve the consistent implementation of internal controls within 
SASSA SCM processes? 
 
 
   
 
Head Office Fraud and Corruption Investigations Manager (Participant FCI5): 
 
1. What is the role of the fraud and corruption unit within the SASSA SCM processes?  
2. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA? 
3. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”   
4. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
5. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue?  
6. What are your priorities when developing fraud and corruption strategies?  
7. Why is dealing with possible tax evasion not a prioritised strategy?  
8. What risks have you identified relating to fraud and corruption in the SCM processes?  
9. How do you deal with SCM fraudulent and corrupt activities when discovered?  
10. How have you been succeeding in terms of dealing with fraud and corruption activities that relate 
to SCM processes?  
11. How have you been doing in terms of recovering back what has been lost to fraud and corruption 
activities at SASSA particularly losses in the SCM?  
12. What are your challenges in recovering the money that has been lost? 
13. What would you suggest must be done to minimise possible tax evasion, “fraud and corruption” 
within the SASSA SCM Process? 
 
Head office Internal Auditor (Participant INA6): 
 
1. What is your mandate as internal audit unit within SASSA‟s SCM processes?  
2. How often do you test compliance with internal controls within the SASSA SCM processes? 
3. How have you been succeeding in terms of the testing the compliance with internal controls? 
4. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA?  
5. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
6. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
7. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
8. What process do you follow to test compliance with internal controls within SASSA SCM 
processes? 
9. What has your findings and recommendation been regarding the effectiveness and consistent 
implementation of SCM internal controls? 
10. What have been the findings and recommendation on possible tax evasion related controls? 
11. How successful is SASSA in terms of implementing the existing SCM internal controls, in terms 
of you opining how successful is SASSA? 
12. What are the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls? 
13. How has SASSA been succeeding in terms of recovering back funds that has been lost to fraud 
and corruption activities at SASSA particularly losses within the supply chain processes? 
14. What improvements, if any, can be recommended:  
 To improve the effectiveness of SASSA SCM internal controls with regards to possible tax 
evasion? 
 To ensure that SASSA implements its internal controls effectively and consistently? 
 To ensure that EMEs contracting with SASSA comply with all SCM processes truly and 
honestly to minimise possible tax evasion? 
 
Head office Risk Assessment Manager (Participant RAS7):  
 
1. What is the role of the risk assessment unit within SASSA SCM processes?  
2. How often do you perform risk assessment in SASSA? 
3. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used to fund 
SASSA?  
4. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
5. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
6. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
7. What risks relating to possible tax evasion, have you identified as a unit within the SCM value 
chain? 
   
 
8. What mitigating strategy have you recommended or implemented to minimize fraud and 
corruption within SCM processes? 
9. What are the risks of not performing risk assessment? 
10. How have you been succeeding in terms of mitigating the risks of fraud and corruption activities 
that relate to SCM processes? 
11. How have you been succeeding in mitigating the risk of not recovering back funds that have been 
lost to fraud and corruption, particularly losses in the SCM? 
12. What would your suggestions be to improve the SASSA risk assessment in relation to possible 
tax evasion within the SCM processes? 
 
  
   
 
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS 
SUMMARY OF PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH SASSA STAFF MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE 
SCM VALUE CHAIN 
 
Participant SCM1 
 
1. What process do you follow when selecting or nominating an EME to provide services or 
goods to SASSA?  
 
 Request for a certain service by end user of goods 
 Check if procurement method is quotation or tender or petty cash   
 Below 500 000 is quotation 
 Source the service providers from the Central database 
 You say supplier and punch commodity you want 
 System provide a list of suppliers that are Tax compliant 
 Sometimes nomination register, 
 Get a CSD report 
 
2. What documents do you handle during this process? 
 
 Checklist, Budget report, Terms of references and Memo.  
 
3. What criteria do you follow when rotating an EME during the selection process? 
 
 There is a gab 
 Since the introduction of the CSD 
 
4. How do you ensure the directors of an EME are not the same persons during the rotation 
process? 
 
 We use to run a report on our internal system with name of the company, registration 
number tax number, banking details, list of directors. 
 Now everything is done via CSD. 
 
5. What process do you follow to confirm tax compliance by the EMEs? What documents do 
you handle during this process? 
 
 Two ways of confirming the suppliers tax compliance. 
o Supplier to submit verification PIN which through central database, which is real time 
link. 
o Call SARS and get a tax clearance certificate. 
 
6. What could be the reasons for not adhering to the SCM processes? 
 
 Unintentionally not following the process. 
 Deliberate fraud and corruption. 
 
7. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Government revenue is received from Personal income tax, Value Added Tax, Company 
taxes, Foreign and Custom taxes. 
 
 
8. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”. 
    
 
 
 An Illegal practice by person or a company to intentionally under declare or omit certain 
income so that tax can be minimum. 
 They do not declare the true reflection of the business. 
 
9. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
 
 Tax evasion is also fraud and not legal. 
 Fraudulent tax clearance certificate. 
 
10.   How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 Government will not collect more. 
 
11. What would you suggest must be done to minimize possible tax evasion within the 
SASSA SCM Process? 
 
 Rely on a service provider to declare the correct information then you are not going 
anywhere. 
 
 
 
Participant SCM  
 
1. What process do you follow when selecting or nominating an EME to provide services or 
goods to SASSA?  
 
 Follow the process on Central Supply Database (CSD) 
 Suppliers are registered per commodity. 
 
2. What documents do you handle during this process? 
 
 Normal request or requisition. 
 MAAA. 
 
3. What criteria do you follow when rotating an EME during the selection process? 
 
 That is still a challenge. 
 No specific criteria. 
 
4. How do you ensure the directors of an EME are not the same persons during the rotation 
process? 
 
 No restriction, a person can register as many companies as they like, in different 
commodities. 
 
5. What process do you follow to confirm tax compliance by the EMEs? What documents do 
you handle during this process? 
 
 Print the CSD report. 
 SARS authentication or SARS verification is real time to give tax status whether the supplier 
is tax compliant or not. 
 
 
6. What could be the reasons for not adhering to the SCM processes? 
 
    
 
 Want to collude with the aim of doing or committing fraud. 
 Suppliers dodging tax. 
 Evading tax. 
 
7. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Government revenue collection is from 
o Normal income tax. 
o Value Added Tax. 
o Budget bids. 
 Budget bids and plans are submitted to national treasury. 
 
8. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”?  
 
 Dodging to pay tax. 
 Companies they will make sure that they do as much as possible to ensure that they evade 
tax. 
 
9. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
 
 They go hand in hand. 
 Fraud and corruption it robs also the revenue. 
 In corruption cash is paid as Kickbacks. 
 If there was no corruption we wouldn‟t have tax evasion. 
 
10. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 SARS collected less by 30 billion in the previous financial year. 
 
11. What would you suggest must be done to minimize possible tax evasion within the 
SASSA SCM Process? 
 
 Sensitize and educate the buyers how to check tax compliance issues. 
 
 
 
Participant SCM  
 
1. What is the role of the compliance unit within the SCM processes? 
 
 To ensure compliance those rules and regulations. 
 To ensure that tax matters on the supplier or the service provider are in place. 
 Tax clearance confirmation with SARS. 
 Ensure compliance to SCM policies. 
 Ensure compliance to treasury regulations. 
 
2. What documents do you require during the process? 
 
 Checklist. 
 SBD forms. 
 Quotation. 
 Bid file. 
 Bid evaluation committee report. 
 Bid specification committee report. 
    
 
 
3. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
 
 Corporations or Companies do not declare the full income so that they can pay less tax. 
 
4. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
 
 Supplier may collude with SARS official to issue a tax clearance certificate even when not in 
good standing. 
 
5. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Governments revenue is in a form of tax collection 
 South African Revenue Services is the custodians of revenue 
 Companies and individuals submit their tax returns 
 
6. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 Affect revenue negatively. 
 State collects less money. 
 Government will not be in the position to fund other projects. 
 Allocated less budget. 
 
7. What process do you follow to confirm tax compliance by the EMEs? 
 
 There are two processes: 
 
o Confirm the tax status of the supplier  or service providers via Central Supplier 
Database. 
o Confirming the tax status by phoning in at SARS submit company registration number, 
Tax number as SARS will give a reference code for the tax status the suppliers must 
have  submitted an original tax clearance certificate. 
 
8. What proof does SARS provide to confirm the tax compliance? 
 
 We rely 99 per cent on the central supplier database. 
 Supplier must submit the tax clearance certificate. 
 
9. How do you ensure the directors of EMEs are not the same persons during the rotation 
process? 
 
 Risk and a big challenge. 
 Service providers they have directorships in many companies, there is no legislation. 
 Service providers to hold more than one directorship, there isn‟t any law that stops one from 
having multiply directorships in companies. 
 Selection is done on companies not on directors. 
 System just picks up doesn‟t pick up the directors. 
 Rotate manually you only do that when they submit their documents. 
 
10. What could be the reasons for not adhering to SCM processes by SCM practitioners or 
any other SASSA official? 
 
 It could be out of ignorance. 
    
 
 Somebody is just ignoring the law. 
 Purposefully people will just want to bypass the SCM processes. 
 Lack of knowledge. 
 
11. What would you suggest could be done by SASSA to improve tax compliance by EMEs 
within the SCM processes to minimize possible tax evasion? 
 
 Put systems in place for monitoring and ensuring compliance to tax matters. 
 We rely on SARS to tell us on measures to put in place in terms of none-compliance. 
 
 
Participant INM4 
 
1. What is your mandate as internal control unit within SASSA SCM processes? 
 
 Monitoring implementation and compliance. 
 Identify the policy gabs. 
 Review their policy. 
 Ensure that those deficiencies are addressed. 
 Investigation of financial misconduct cases. 
 Irregular expenditure. 
 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 
 Quality responses given to the auditors. 
 
2. How often do you review the SCM internal controls?  
 
 No necessary some time lines 
 
3. How have you been doing in terms of reviewing the internal controls annually, and what 
has been the challenges?  
 
 Capacity in internal control unit, in terms of the human resources like the number of official.  
 Secondly in terms of the skill which we are trying to build. 
 
4. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Government collect revenue obviously from taxes paid by companies and individuals. 
 Budget get appropriated through appropriation bill through national treasury. 
 Promulgated by government and by parliament. 
 
5. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”?  
 
 Tax evasion in a way is part of fraud. 
 Individual or companies do not disclosed their correct income. 
 
6. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
 
 They do wrong things knowingly and intentionally in order to evade the tax. 
 
7. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 Government does not get the money that it should get. 
 Government cannot fund government programs which obviously deal with the wellbeing of 
the citizens in the country.  
 Delays the economic growth in the country. 
    
 
 Can‟t put infrastructure. 
 
8. What internal controls relating to possible tax evasion, have you implemented in SASSA’s 
SCM processes?  
 
 Government through national treasury all companies are registered with the central Supplier 
Database so that SARS interface tax compliance status of those companies before you 
appoint a company. 
 
9. How successful is SASSA in terms of implementing the existing SCM internal controls?  
 
 Number of financial Misconduct cases which relate to irregular expenditure and fruitless. 
 Think there is a deficiencies within the supply chain controls. 
 Deficiencies are not dealt properly by management. 
 Lack of accountability and responsibility by management. 
 
10. What causes the internal controls not to be implemented effectively and consistently by 
the SCM practitioners?  
 
 Limited knowledge, skills and experience, Induction, accountability. 
 Lack of monitoring. 
 Management might not closely monitoring the work. 
 Signing in terms of the delegations. 
 Review the transactions. 
 Segregation of duties. 
 Lack Compliance. 
 Evaluated appropriately. 
 Deficiency is also one of the problems. 
 Company without enforcing that the company register for VAT. 
 
11. What are the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls? 
 
 Government will not make the revenue because award will be made to companies that do 
not pay tax. 
 Impact on the fiscus of government. 
 Result in your irregular expenditure and fruitless expenditure. 
 SASSA is sitting in more than a Rbillion of irregular expenditure. 
 
12. What would you suggest to improve the consistent implementation of internal controls 
within SASSA SCM processes? 
 
 Professional development, training to be conducted on a regular basis. 
 Updates in relation to tax requirements. 
 Compliance with the tax laws and professional training. 
 Improve knowledge in Management Branches and Executives. 
 Know the strategies. 
 Treasury‟s supply database system companies are registered. 
 Complying with the tax, verification of the revenues companies are disclosing is the correct 
amount. 
 Immediate access to such information. 
 Registered for tax because of the thresholds. 
 
 
Participant FCI5 
 
    
 
1. What is the role of the fraud and corruption unit within the SASSA SCM processes? 
 
 Detect. 
 Investigate. 
 Suspicious transactions. 
 
2. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Government receives its revenue from taxes collected by SARS. 
 From all service providers doing business with SASSA. 
 
3. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”?  
 
 To avoid paying tax. 
 Submit a nil return. 
 
4. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM?  
 
 Hiding documentations. 
 
5. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 Government does not reach its goals. 
 Economy is not growing. 
 
6. What are your priorities when developing fraud and corruption strategies? 
 
 Core function of the organization which is Social grants and officials themselves. 
 Some are also corrupt they defraud the system. 
 Fraudulent activities are being happening at SASSA. 
 
7. Why is dealing with possible tax evasion not a prioritised strategy?  
 
 Requirements that need to be followed 
 
8. What risks have you identified relating to fraud and corruption in the SCM processes? 
 
 Anybody can sign the GRV. 
 Practitioners accept any other quotation, which lead to paying wrong organization or 
SASSA be defrauded. 
 Companies whenever they submit quotations they claim not to have registered for tax 
 Finance they do not even detect that. 
 Claiming for VAT meanwhile they are not registered for VAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
9. How do you deal with SCM fraudulent and corrupt activities when discovered?  
 
 We engage the supervision. 
 If we find that there are some suspicious transactions. 
 We start taking statements. 
 Statement is commissioned. 
 If is a criminal case we refer it to SAPS. 
 We refer it  to  SAPS. 
    
 
 Suppliers we usually request the money back. 
 Request the bank to freeze. 
 If we are unable to get our money back. 
 Refer the matter to SAPS. 
 
10. How have you been succeeding in terms of dealing with fraud and corruption activities 
that relate to SCM processes?  
 
 Detect the fraud. 
 Omissions of the processes the policy not followed. 
 
11. How have you been doing in terms of recovering back what has been lost to fraud and 
corruption activities at SASSA particularly losses in the SCM?  
 
 Financial misconduct board to recover the funds. 
 Recovered through the external service provider. 
 Recovering that money via pensions. 
 Succeeding through deduction garnishees. 
 FMB made the person to pay. 
 Write directly to that person if there is any transgressions and reach an agreement. 
 Whenever it involves the supplier we refer it to the external service provider and law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
12. What are your challenges in recovering the money that has been lost? 
 
 We haven‟t had any challenges but, sometimes if you chase the Supplier you might not win 
because you never know where the supplier is. 
 People who pay inside we can deal with. 
 
13. What would you suggest must be done to minimize possible tax evasion, “fraud and 
corruption” within the SASSA SCM Process? 
 
 SASSA always to liaise with the national treasury to make sure that there are no changes. 
 Company registered becomes debunked they work on a twelve months period twelve 
month is too long cut maybe to 6 or even less if possible. 
 This thing of three quotations kills us. 
 Computer should do random list of suppliers not a person to choose companies that he 
prefers. 
  
    
 
 
Participant INA6 
 
1. What is your mandate as internal audit unit within SASSA’s SCM processes? 
 
 To evaluate the system of internal control, whether they are adequate, effective efficient and 
recommend corrective action. 
 
2. How often do you test compliance with internal controls within the SASSA SCM 
processes? 
 
 We test it annually. 
 We draft an audit plan. 
 We have cyclical audit Supply Chain Management  because we believe a lot is happening 
within the procurement processes. 
 
3. How have you been succeeding in terms of the testing the compliance with internal 
controls? 
 
 We have been successful. 
 Separate the tender processes. 
 Normal supply chain management process. 
 
4. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 Revenue is that government is collecting tax. 
 Budget will be allocated. 
 
5. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
 
 Suppliers misrepresents their income. 
 
6. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
 
 Tax evasion is  an Internationally, premeditated misrepresentation to benefit illegally. 
 Tax evasion is an offence and a criminal offence. 
 When you do tax evasion it‟s a fraud. 
 Service provider collusion leads to corruption. 
 
7. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 Government is losing money to develop projects and fund the mandates the government 
want to achieve. 
 
8. What process do you follow to test compliance with internal controls within SASSA SCM 
processes? 
 
 Business process flow. 
 Do the risk analysis of controls that are available to mitigate. 
 Select a sample of transactions. 
 Controls that are in place are adequate to check that are effective to assist with the Supply 
Chain Management Process. 
 
    
 
9. What has your findings and recommendation been regarding the effectiveness and 
consis-tent implementation of SCM internal controls? 
 
 Controls are adequate, not effective, efficient because of one abuse of authority. 
 Senior officials force junior officials to process transaction knowing very well that those 
transaction are fraudulent. 
 Control that is in place will not be functioning because official within the SCM collude with 
Service provider to double the amount and share the money. 
 
10. What has your findings and recommendation been on possible tax evasion related 
controls? 
 
 We have never specifically audited tax evasion. 
 
11. How successful is SASSA in terms of implementing the existing SCM internal controls, in 
terms of you opining how successful is SASSA? 
 
 Controls that are in place are adequate. 
 Officials are doing deliberately because there is no consequence management. 
 People are just given verbal warning or the case taken to the Financial Misconduct Board 
and It will be condoned. 
 
12. What are the consequences of not complying with the SCM internal controls? 
 
 Irregular and fruitless expenditure. 
 Could have been avoided. 
 
13. How has SASSA been succeeding in terms of recovering back funds that has been lost to 
fraud and corruption activities at SASSA particularly losses within the supply chain 
processes? 
 
 Not convinced and not satisfied that we are wining. 
 Person commits the crime and then they resign. 
 We straggle as an organization to get information from that official. 
 No corporation from the state department so that we can recover the money. 
 Ends being prescribed so we have to write it off as a loss. 
 I won‟t say we are also succeeding. 
 Do not think we have either enough staff and we are not taking this seriously. 
 Service providers declare themselves as liquidated. 
 
14. What improvements, if any, can be recommended  
 
 To improve the effectiveness of SASSA’s SCM internal controls with regards to 
possible tax evasion? 
 
o Never been audited. 
o We have to start from the beginning by risk analysis to check the red flags of tax 
evasion. 
o If officials are involved consequence management should be implemented. 
 
 To ensure that SASSA implements its internal controls effectively and consistently? 
 
o Consequence management. 
o Interface with systems like CIPC, SARS and department of home affairs. 
o life style audit. 
 
    
 
 To ensure that EMEs contracting with SASSA comply with all SCM processes truly 
and honestly to minimise possible tax evasion? 
 
o Educate our SMMEs. 
o Consequences should they not comply. 
o Impose a fines. 
o Suppliers should be blacklisted. 
 
 
Participant RAS7  
 
1. What is the role of the risk assessment unit within SASSA SCM processes? 
 
 To facilitate the risk assessment processes in the whole of SASSA. 
 Public Sector Risk Management Framework. 
 
2. How often do you perform risk assessment in SASSA? 
 
 Ideally we supposed to perform them annually. 
 Supposed to do risk assessment regularly. 
 Unfortunately we fail. 
 Due to challenges. 
 
3. What is your understanding about the government revenue collection process that is used 
to fund SASSA? 
 
 SASSA is funded through the revenue collected through SARS. 
 
4. What is your understanding about the concept “tax evasion”? 
 
 Illegal way of trying to reduce your tax. 
 
5. What is the relationship between tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” within the SCM? 
 
 “Fraud and corruption” is an  umbrella name for tax evasion. 
 They are actually one and the same thing. 
 
6. How does tax evasion and “fraud and corruption” affect the collection of revenue? 
 
 It affects negatively the revenue collection. 
 
7. What risks relating to possible tax evasion, have you identified as a unit within the SCM 
value chain? 
 
 We have challenges in the risk management unit. 
 Not yet had a risk assessment for the supply chain unit. 
 We could not even identify the tax evasion risk. 
 Not our mandate 
 
8. What mitigating strategy have you recommended or implemented to minimise fraud and 
corruption within SCM processes? 
 
 Never had a risk assessment for the supply chain unit. 
 Wouldn‟t have the mitigating strategies relating to tax evasion. 
 
9. What are the risks of not performing risk assessment? 
    
 
 
 Risk are that you are unable to identify relevant and high risks. 
 Risk of not managing the highest risk. 
 
10. How have you been succeeding in terms of mitigating the risks of fraud and corruption 
activities that relate to SCM processes? 
 
 There is a fraud and corruption unit that exist. 
 It has been handling issues that relate to fraud and corruption that relates to SCM. 
 Financial misconduct board. 
 
11. How have you been succeeding in mitigating the risk of not recovering back funds that 
have been lost to fraud and corruption, particularly losses in the SCM? 
 
 We do not have that information as a risk management unit. 
 We were never involved in this process. 
 
12. What would your suggestions be to improve the SASSA risk assessment in relation to 
possible tax evasion within the SCM processes? 
 
 Have a good tone at the top, the executives. 
 Make sure the control environment is good. 
 Risk management is never been discussed at EXCO or Branch meetings only in audit 
committee meetings. 
 Should be discussed in every big meeting. 
 Good knowledge of risk management. 
 Make risk management a standing item. 
 Risk not taken seriously especially at the top. 
 Risk management supposed to report straight to CEO unfortunately that is not the case. 
 When SASSA was establish people did not have that knowledge. 
 Infant stage in our organization in terms of risk assessment. 
 
  
    
 
APPENDIX C: FRAMEWORK OF THE QUESTIONS 
 
The questions, the reasons why they were asked and to whom, are presented below as per themes 
emanated from the data analysis: 
 
Please note: Section    , section 2.4 and section 2.5 is presented in chapter 2 above as separate 
themes and have been combine in theme 2 in section      and the following table.  
 
Theme 1: SASSA’s procurement and source of revenue 
 
Question asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
 What is your understand-
ing about the government 
revenue collection process 
that is used to fund 
SASSA?  
All participants were 
asked this question. 
 
Reason: To establish if they understand 
how SASSA is funded, so that they can 
contribute effectively to the strategy to 
minimise possible tax evasion that the 
researcher is envisaged to be proposed. 
 
The other reason for this question was to 
confirm that SASSA is funded from the 
revenue collected from taxes, through 
the South African budget process.  
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . .  
 
Theme 2: Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
 
Ineffectiveness of the existing internal controls 
 What process do you 
follow when selecting or 
nominating an EME to pro-
vide services or goods to 
SASSA? 
Participants SCM1 and 
SCM  were asked this 
question. 
Reason: To understand the SASSA 
SCM processes so that the researcher 
can be able to establish if the existing 
internal controls are effective enough to 
minimise the risk possible tax evasion 
within the SASSA SCM processes. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What document do you 
handle during the proces-
ses? 
Participants SCM1, 
SCM and SCM3 were 
asked this question. 
Reason: To establish the documents 
that are being handled during the pro-
cess of appointing an EME in order to 
confirm if the tax clearance certificate is 
one of the documents. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 
 What is your understand-
ing about the concept “tax 
All participants were 
asked this question. 
Reason: To establish if the participants 
understand the concept tax evasion so 
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
evasion”?  
 
 that they (participants) can contribute 
effectively to the strategy to minimise 
possible tax evasion that the researcher 
is envisaged to be proposed. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How does tax evasion and 
“fraud and corruption” 
affect the collection of 
revenue? 
 
All participants were 
asked this question. 
 
Reason: To establish if the participants 
understand the effect of tax evasion in 
the revenue collection so that they (parti-
cipants) can contribute effectively to the 
strategy to minimise possible tax eva-
sion that the researcher is envisaged to 
be proposed. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What is the relationship 
between tax evasion and 
“fraud and corruption” 
within the SCM? 
 
All participants were 
asked this question. 
 
Reason: To establish if the participants 
understand the relationship between tax 
evasion and fraud and corruption so that 
they (participants) can contribute effecti-
vely to the strategy to minimise possible 
tax evasion that the researcher is envisa-
ged to be proposed. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How have you been suc-
ceeding in terms of dealing 
with fraud and corruption 
activities that relate to 
SCM processes?  
 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
To establish if SASSA has an effective 
strategy to deal with fraud and corrup-
tion, including possible tax evasion. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  .  
 
 How have SASSA been 
succeeding in terms of 
recovering back funds that 
has been lost to fraud and 
corruption activities at 
SASSA, particularly losses 
within the SCM process? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5 and 
INA6. 
 
To establish if SASSA has an effective 
strategy to recover funds that have been 
lost to fraud and corruption activities 
with-in the SCM including possible tax 
evasion. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  .  
 
 
 
 What criteria do you follow 
to rotate the EME or the 
suppliers? 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM1, 
SCM2 and SCM3. 
To establish if the existing internal con-
trols were effective enough to minimise 
the risk of possible tax evasion, fraud 
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
 and corruption within the SCM process. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How do you ensure that 
the directors in the EME or 
the supplier are not the 
same directors in the com-
pany that you selecting? 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM1, 
SCM2 and SCM3. 
 
Reason: To establish if the existing inter-
nal controls were effective enough to 
minimise the risk of possible tax evasion, 
fraud and corruption within the SCM 
process. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What process do you 
follow to confirm tax com-
pliance by the EMEs? 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM1, 
SCM2 and SCM3. 
 
Reason: To establish if the existing inter-
nal controls were effective enough to 
minimise the risk of possible tax evasion, 
fraud and corruption within the SCM 
process. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What is the role of fraud 
and corruption unit within 
the SASSA SCM proces-
ses? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish the role of the 
Fraud and Corruption Unit and its scope 
of work in order  to confirm if the possible 
tax evasion is covered in the SASSA 
fraud and corruption strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . .  
 
 What is your priority when 
developing fraud and cor-
ruption strategy? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish if the possible tax 
evasion is prioritised in the SASSA fraud 
and corruption strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 Why is dealing with pos-
sible tax evasion not a 
prioritised strategy? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish the reason why 
possible tax evasion is not prioritised in 
the SASSA fraud and corruption strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 What risks have you iden-
tified relating to fraud and 
corruption, and tax 
evasion? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish if the risk of pos-
sible tax evasion is one of the risks iden-
tified in the SASSA fraud and corruption 
strategy. 
 
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How do you deal with 
SCM fraudulent and cor-
rupt activities when disco-
vered? 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish as how SASSA 
deals with the fraud and corruption cases 
involving EMEs. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What is the role of the risk 
assessment unit within 
SASSA SCM processes? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish the role of the Risk 
Assessment Unit and its scope of work in 
order to confirm if possible tax evasion is 
covered in the SASSA‟s risk manage-
ment processes and strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  .  and section  . . 
 
 What risks relating to pos-
sible tax evasion, have 
you identified as a unit 
within the SCM value 
chain? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish if the possible tax 
evasion is covered in the SASSA‟s risk 
management strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What mitigating strategy 
have you recommended or 
implemented to minimise 
possible tax evasion or 
fraud and corruption within 
SCM processes? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish if there is any miti-
gation strategy to minimise possible tax 
evasion in the SASSA‟s risk manage-
ment processes. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How have you been suc-
ceeding in terms of mitiga-
ting the risks of fraud and 
corruption activities that 
relate to SCM processes? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish if SASSA is suc-
ceeding with the existing internal controls 
to deal with the risk of fraud and corrup-
tion activities and to confirm if the pos-
sible tax evasion is covered in SASSA‟s 
risk management strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is 
presented in section  . . 
 
 How have you been suc-
ceeding in terms of miti-
gating the risks of recove-
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish if SASSA is suc-
ceeding with the existing internal controls 
to deal with the risk of not recovering 
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature 
ring of funds lost to fraud 
and corruption activities 
that relate to SCM proces-
ses? 
funds that have been lost as the result of 
fraud and corruption activities and also to 
confirm if the possible tax evasion is 
covered in the SASSA‟s risk manage-
ment strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is 
presented in section  . . 
 
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature  
 
Inconsistent implementation of the existing internal controls. 
 What is your mandate as 
internal control unit within 
SASSA SCM processes? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
Reason: To establish the role of the 
internal control unit and its scope of work 
in order to confirm if possible tax evasion 
is covered in the SASSA‟s internal con-
trol processes and strategy. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is 
presented in section  . . 
 
 How successful is SASSA 
in terms of implementing 
the existing SCM internal 
controls? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
Reason: To establish if SASSA is suc-
ceeding in implementing the existing 
internal controls in order to confirm what 
has been reported in the SASSA annual 
report by the SASSA executive manage-
ment. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What are the consequen-
ces of not complying with 
the SCM internal controls? 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
 
 
 
Reason: To establish the consequences 
of not complying with the SCM internal 
controls in order to confirm what has 
been reported in the SASSA annual re-
port by the SASSA executive manage-
ment. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How often do you perform 
risk assessment in 
SASSA? 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
 
Reason: To establish if SASSA performs 
its risk assessment regularly as required 
by the SASSA Risk Management stra-
tegic document. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature  
sented in section  .  and section  . . 
 
 What are the risks of not 
performing risk assess-
ment? 
This question was asked 
to participant RAS7. 
Reason: To establish the risk of not per-
forming the risk assessment regularly. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How often do you review 
the SCM internal controls? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
 
Reason: To establish is SASSA review 
its internal controls regularly. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section 2.5 and section  . . 
 
 How have been doing in 
terms of reviewing the 
internal controls annual-
ly, and what has been 
the challenges?  
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
challenges in reviewing the controls 
regularly. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What causes the internal 
controls not to be imple-
mented effectively? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
 
Reason: To establish the causes of not 
implementing the internal controls effec-
tively.  
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What could be the 
reasons for not adhering 
to the SCM process? 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM1, 
participant SCM2 and 
participant SCM3. 
Reason: To establish the contributory 
factors that could contribute to not adhe-
ring to SCM process. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What internal controls 
relating to possible tax 
evasion, have you imple-
mented in SASSA’s SCM 
processes? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
 
Reason: To establish if internal controls 
for the risk of possible tax evasion have 
been implemented in the SASSA SCM. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What is your mandate as 
internal audit unit within 
SASSA’s SCM processes? 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish the role of the 
internal control unit and its scope of work 
in order to confirm if the risk of possible 
tax evasion is covered in their scope of 
audit when auditing SASSA‟s SCM inter-
nal controls. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
    
 
Question Asked Participant Reason for the question and support-
ing literature  
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . .  
 
 What has your findings 
and recommendation been 
regarding the effectiveness 
and consistent implemen-
tation of SCM internal con-
trols? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
findings and recommendation made re-
garding the effectiveness and consistent 
implementation of SCM internal controls. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What have been the find-
ings and recommendation 
on possible tax evasion 
related controls? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
findings and recommendation made re-
garding the risk of possible tax evasion 
related controls. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 How successful is SASSA 
in terms of implementing 
the existing SCM internal 
controls, in terms of your 
opining how successful is 
SASSA? 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish if SASSA is imple-
menting the SCM internal controls accor-
dingly. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 
 
  
    
 
Theme 3: Proposed Solutions 
 
Question asked Participant Reason for the question and 
supporting literature 
 
To improve the effectiveness of the existing internal control. 
 What would you suggest 
must be done to minimise 
possible tax evasion within 
the SASSA SCM Process? 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM1 
and SCM . 
Reason: To establish the solutions that 
could be introduced by SASSA to mini-
mise the risk of possible tax evasion 
within the SASSA SCM processes. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What would you suggest 
could be done by SASSA 
to improve tax compliance 
by EMEs within the SCM 
processes to minimise 
possible tax evasion? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant SCM . 
Reason: To establish the solutions that 
could be introduced by SASSA to im-
prove tax compliance by EMEs within the 
SCM processes to minimize possible tax 
evasion. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What would you suggest 
must be done to minimize 
possible tax evasion, 
“fraud and corruption” 
within the SASSA SCM 
Process? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant FCI5. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
solutions that could be introduced by 
SASSA to minimise the risk of possible 
tax evasion, “fraud and corruption” within 
the SASSA SCM processes. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 
To improve consistency in implementing the existing internal controls. 
 What would your sugges-
tions be to improve the 
SASSA risk assessment in 
relation to possible tax 
evasion within the SCM 
processes?  
 
This question was 
asked to participant 
RAS7. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
solutions that could be introduced by 
SASSA to improve the SASSA risk 
assessment in relation to possible tax 
evasion within the SCM processes.  
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What would you suggest 
to improve the effective-
ness of SASSA’s SCM 
internal controls with 
regards to possible tax 
evasion?  
 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INM4. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
solutions that could be introduced by 
SASSA to improve the effectiveness of 
SASSA SCM internal controls with 
regards to possible tax evasion. 
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 What improvements can 
be recommended, if any: 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
solutions that could be introduced by 
    
 
Question asked Participant Reason for the question and 
supporting literature 
To ensure that SASSA 
implements its internal 
controls effectively and 
consistently?   
 
 
SASSA to ensure that SASSA imple-
ments its internal controls effectively and 
consistently.  
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 What improvements can 
be recommended, if any: 
To ensure that EMEs 
contracting with SASSA 
comply with all SCM pro-
cesses truly and honestly 
to minimise possible tax 
evasion? 
 
This question was asked 
to participant INA6. 
Reason: To establish if there are any 
solutions that could be introduced by 
SASSA to ensure that EMEs contracting 
with SASSA comply with all SCM pro-
cesses truly and honestly to minimise 
possible tax evasion.  
 
Literature: The literature supporting the 
responses from the participants is pre-
sented in section  . . 
 
 
  
    
 
APPENDIX D: CODING AND THEMES 
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
SCM1    Government SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Revenue SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Personal income tax SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Value Added Tax SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Company taxes SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Foreign SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Custom SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Taxes SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    Governments revenue is in a 
form of tax collection 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    South African Revenue 
Services 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    Custodians of revenue SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    Companies SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    Individuals SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    Tax returns SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM3    National treasury SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     Government revenue 
collection 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     Normal income tax SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     Value Added Tax SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     National treasury SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     Budget bids SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM2     Budget plans SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INM4     Government collect revenue 
obviously from taxes 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INM4     Paid by companies and 
individuals 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INM4     Get appropriated through 
appropriation bill 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INM4     National treasury SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INM4     Promulgated by government SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
INM4     By parliament SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
FCI5     Government revenue SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
FCI5     SARS is collecting all taxes SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
FCI5     From all service providers SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
FCI5     Doing business with SASSA SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INA6     Revenue is that government 
is collecting tax 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
INA6 
    
Budget will be allocated SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
RAS7     SASSA is funded through the 
revenue collected 
SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
RAS7 
    
Through SARS SASSA‟s procurement and source of 
revenue 
SCM1    Illegal practice Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Person or a company Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Intentionally under declare Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    They do not declare the true 
reflection 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Omit certain income Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    So that tax can be minimum Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Corporations Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Companies Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Do not declare the full 
income 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    So that they can pay less tax. Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Dodging to pay tax Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Companies they will make 
sure that they do as much as 
possible to ensure that they 
evade tax. 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Tax evasion in a way is part 
of fraud 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Individual or companies do 
not disclosed their correct 
income 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     To avoid paying tax Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Submit a nil return Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Suppliers Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Misrepresents Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Income Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Illegal way of trying to reduce 
your tax 
Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Checklist Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Budget report Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Terms of references Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Memo Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Above R500     Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Blacklisted Factors contributing  to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Request for a certain service Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Procurement method Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
SCM1   Quotation Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Tender Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Petty cash   Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Below 500     Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Central database Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Commodity Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1   Tax compliant Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Nomination register, Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    CSD report Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Name of the company Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Registration number Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Tax number Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Banking details Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    List of directors Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Internal database Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Two ways of confirming the 
suppliers tax compliance. 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Supplier to submit verification 
PIN 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Call SARS Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Through central database Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Real time link Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Tax clearance certificate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Unintentionally not following 
the process 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Deliberate fraud and 
corruption 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Tax evasion is also fraud Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Not legal Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Fraudulent tax clearance 
certificate. 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Government will not collect 
more 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    To ensure compliance those 
rules and regulations 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    To ensure that tax matters on 
the supplier or the service 
provider are in place 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Tax clearance confirmation 
with SARS 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Ensure compliance to SCM 
policies 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Ensure compliance to 
treasury regulations 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Checklist Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    SBD forms Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Quotation Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Bid file Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Bid evaluation committee Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Bid specification committee Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Bid adjudication committee Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Tender Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    We rely 99 percent on the 
central supplier database 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
SCM3    Tax clearance certificate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Supplier may collude Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    SARS official Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Tax clearance certificate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Not in good standing Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Affect revenue negatively Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    State collects less money Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Government will not be in the 
position to fund other projects 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Allocated less budget Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Two processes Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    They submit an original tax 
clearance certificate 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Confirm the tax status of the 
supplier  or service providers 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Central Supplier Database Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Confirming the tax status by 
phoning in at SARS 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Company registration number Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Tax number Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Reference code Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3 
   
We rely 99 percent on the 
central supplier database 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Tax clearance certificate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Risk and a big challenge Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    Service providers they have 
directorships in many 
companies 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3    There is no legislation Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Service providers to hold 
more than one directorship 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     There isn‟t any law that stops Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     One from having multiply 
directorships in companies 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Selection is done on 
companies not on directors 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     System just picks up doesn‟t 
pick up the directors 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Rotate manually you only do 
that when they submit their 
documents 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     It could be out of ignorance Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Somebody is just ignoring the 
law 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Purposefully people will just 
want to bypass the SCM 
processes 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM3     Lack of knowledge Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Central Supply Database 
(CSD) 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Commodity Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Normal request or requisition Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     MAAA Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     That is still a challenge Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
SCM2     No specific criteria Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     No restriction Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     A person can register as 
many companies as the like 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Different commodities Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     SARS authentication Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     SARS verification Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Tax status Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Tax compliant Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Real time Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2      Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Want to collude with the aim 
off doing or committing fraud 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Suppliers dogging tax Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Evading tax Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     They go hand in hand Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Fraud and corruption it robes 
also the revenue 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     kickbacks Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     If there was no corruption we 
wouldn‟t have tax evasion 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     SARS collected less by 30 
billion 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM2     Previous financial year Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Monitoring implementation 
and compliance 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Identify the policy gabs Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Review their policy Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Ensure that those 
deficiencies are addressed 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Investigation of financial 
misconduct cases 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Irregular expenditure Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure   
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Quality responses given to 
the auditors 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     No necessary some time 
lines 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Capacity in internal control 
unit 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Man power Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Number of official Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Skill Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     They do wrong things know-
ingly and intentionally in 
order to evade the tax. 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Government does not get the 
money that it should get 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Government cannot fund 
government programs 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Wellbeing of the citizens in 
the country 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Delays the economic growth 
in the country 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
INM4     Can‟t put infrastructure Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Government through national 
treasury 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     All companies are registered Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Central Supplier Database Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     SARS interface tax 
compliance status of those  
companies 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Before you appoint a com-
pany 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Number of financial miscon-
duct cases 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Irregular expenditure and 
fruitless 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Think there is a deficiencies 
within the supply chain con-
trols 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Deficiencies are not dealt 
properly by management 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Lack of accountability and 
responsibility by manage-
ment 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Limited knowledge, skills and 
experience 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Induction Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Accountability Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Lack of monitoring Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Management might not 
closely monitoring the work 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Signing in terms of the dele-
gations 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Review the transections Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Segregation of duties Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Compliance Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Evaluated appropriately Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Deficiency is also one of the 
problems 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Company without enforcing 
that the company register for 
VAT 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Government will not make 
the revenue 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Government will not make 
the revenue 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Award to companies that do 
not pay tax 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Impact on the fiscus of 
government 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Result in your irregular 
expenditure 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     Fruitless expenditure Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INM4     More than a billion of 
irregular expenditure 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Detect Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Investigate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
FCI5     Suspicious transactions Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Hiding documentations Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Government does not reach 
its goals 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Economy is not growing Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Core function of the organi-
sation 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Social grants Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Officials themselves Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Some are also corrupt they 
defraud the system 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Fraudulent activities are 
being happening at SASSA 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Requirements that need to be 
followed 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Anybody can sign the GRV Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Accept any other quotation, Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Wrong organization Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Defrauded Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Companies whenever they 
submit quotations they claim 
not to have registered for tax 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Finance they do not even 
detect that 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Claiming for VAT meanwhile 
they are not registered for 
VAT 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We engage the supervision Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We find that there are some 
transactions 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Start taking statements Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Statement is commissioned Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Criminal case Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We refer it  to  SAPS Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Suppliers we usually request 
the money back 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Request the bank to freeze Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     If we are unable to get our 
money back 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Refer the matter to SAPS Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Detect the fraud Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Omissions of the processes 
the policy not followed 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Financial misconduct board 
to recover the funds 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Recovered through the 
external service provider 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Recovering that money via 
pensions 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Succeeding Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Through deduction Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Garnishees Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     FMB made the person to pay Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     write directly to that person Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Transgressions Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
FCI5     Reach an agreement Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Whenever it involves the 
supplier 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We refer it to the external 
service provider 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Law enforcement agencies Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We haven‟t had any 
challenges 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Sometimes if you chase the 
Supplier you might not win 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     Never know where the 
supplier is 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     People who pay inside Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
FCI5     We can deal with Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     To evaluate the system of 
internal control 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Whether they are adequate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Effective Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Efficient Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Recommend corrective 
action 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Test it annually Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Draft an audit plan Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Supply Chain Management Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Cyclical audit Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     A lot is happening within the 
procurement processes 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     We have been successful Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Separate the tender 
processes 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Normal supply chain 
management process 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Misrepresentation Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Internationally Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Premeditated Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Benefit illegally Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Tax evasion is an offence Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Criminal offence Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     When you do tax evasion it‟s 
a fraud 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Service provider  Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Collusion Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     leads to corruption Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Government is losing Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Money Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     To develop Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Projects Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Fund the mandates the 
government want to achieve 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Business process flow Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Do the risk analysis Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Controls that are available to 
mitigate 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Sample of transections Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
INA6     Controls that are in place are 
adequate 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Effective to assist Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Supply Chain Management 
Process 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Controls are adequate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Not effective, efficient 
because of one abuse of 
authority 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Senior officials Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Force junior officials Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Process transaction Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Knowing very well that those 
transection are fraudulent 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Control that is in place will 
not be functioning 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Official within the SCM Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Service provider Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Double the amount Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Share the money Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     We have never specifically 
audited tax evasion 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Controls that are in place are 
adequate 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Officials are doing 
deliberately 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     No consequence 
management 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Just given verbal warning Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Financial Misconduct Board Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     It will be condoned Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Irregular and fruitless 
expenditure 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Could have been avoided Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Not convinced Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Satisfied that we are wining Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Person commits the crime 
and then they resign 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     We straggle as an organisa-
tion to get information from 
that official 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     No corporation Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     State department so that we 
can recover the money 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Ends being prescribed so we 
have to write it off as a loss 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Won‟t say we are also 
succeeding 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Do not think we have either 
enough staff 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     We are not taking this 
seriously 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Service providers Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
INA6     Declare themselves as 
liquidated 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
RAS7     To facilitate the risk 
assessment processes in the 
whole of SASSA 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Public Sector Risk 
Management Framework. 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Ideally we supposed to 
perform them annually 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Supposed to do risk 
assessment regularly 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Unfortunately we fail Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Due to challenges Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     “Fraud and corruption” Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     The umbrella name Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     For tax evasion Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     They are actually one and the 
same thing 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Negatively Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     It affects the revenue collec-
tion 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     We have challenges in the 
risk management unit 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Not yet had a risk assess-
ment for the supply chain unit 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     We could not even identify 
the tax evasion risk 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Not our mandate Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Never had a risk assessment 
for the supply chain unit 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Wouldn‟t have the mitigating 
strategies relating to tax 
evasion 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Risk are that you are unable 
to identify relevant and high 
risks 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Risk of not managing the 
highest risk 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7      Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     There is a fraud and cor-
ruption unit that exist 
 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     It has been handling issues 
that relate to fraud and 
corruption that relates to 
SCM 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     Financial misconduct board Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     We do not have that 
information as a risk 
management unit 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
RAS7     We were never involved in 
this process 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    There is a gab Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Since the introduction of the 
CSD 
Factors contributing to possible tax evasion 
SCM1    Rely on a service provider to 
declare the correct informa-
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
tion then you are not going 
anywhere 
SCM3     Put systems in place for 
monitoring and ensuring 
compliance to tax matters 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
SCM3     We rely on SARS to tell us on 
measures to put in place in 
terms of none-compliance 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
SCM2     Sensitize Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
SCM2     Educate Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
SCM2     Tax compliance issues Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Professional development Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Training Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Conducted on a regular basis Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Updates in relation to tax 
requirements 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Compliance with the tax laws Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Professional training Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Knowledge Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Management Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Branches Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Executives Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Know the strategies Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Treasury‟s supply database 
system 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Companies are registered Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Complying with the tax Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Verification of the revenues Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Companies are disclosing is 
the correct amount 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Immediate access to such 
information 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INM4     Registered for tax because of 
the thresholds 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     SASSA always to liaise with 
the national treasury 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     To make sure that there are 
no changes 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Company registered Proposed solutions and strategies 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
suggested 
FCI5     Becomes debunked Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     They work on a twelve 
months period 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Twelve month is too long Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Cut maybe to 6 or even less 
if possible 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     This thing of three quotations Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Kills us Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Computer Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Random list of suppliers Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Particular service Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Not a person to choose Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
FCI5     Companies that he prefers Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Never audited Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     We have to start from the 
beginning 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Risk analysis   Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Red flags Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Tax evasion Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Officials are involved Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Consequence management 
should be implemented 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Consequence management Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Interface with systems like 
CIPR, SARS and department 
of home affairs 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     life style audit Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Educate our SMMEs Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Consequences should they 
not comply 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Impose a fines Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
INA6     Be blacklisted Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Have a good tone at the top. Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     executives Proposed solutions and strategies 
    
 
PARTICIPANT Code 
Number 
INITIAL CODING THEMES 
suggested 
RAS7     Control environment is good Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Risk management is never 
been discussed at EXCO 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Branch meetings Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Only in audit committee 
meetings 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     To be discussed in every big 
meeting 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Good knowledge of risk 
management 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Standing item Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Not taken seriously especially 
at the top 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Supposed to report straight to 
CEO 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Unfortunately that is not the 
case 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     People did not have that 
knowledge 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
RAS7     Infant stage in our organisa-
tion in terms of risk assess-
ment 
Proposed solutions and strategies 
suggested 
 
  
    
 
APPENDIX E: DOCUMENTS ANALYSED 
 
DOC 1: SASSA SCM POLICY 
 
1. Type of document: SASSA SCM POLICY 
2. Unique physical qualities of the documents: SASSA‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents: 3 February 2016 
4. Author of the document: Mrs. Virginia Peterson 
5. Position: SASSA‟S CEO 
6. For which users was the document written: SASSA‟s Head and Regional Office Staff 
7. What is the purpose of the document: 
 
This document was written to standardise SCM 
processes within SASSA and to ensure com-
pliance with all procurement legislations, policies 
and regulations.  
8. Why the researcher selected the document: To critically analyse the SASSA SCM processes 
in order to identify the risk of possible tax 
evasion within the SCM process. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for this 
document in particular: 
The analysis revealed that the risk of possible 
tax evasion was never taken into account when 
preparing this document, which makes the SCM 
internal controls ineffective to deal with the risk 
of possible tax evasion in the SCM processes. 
10. Website to access the document: http://home.sassa.gov.za/index.php?option=com
_phocadownload&view=file&id=585:supply-
chain-management-policy&Itemid=2 
 
 
  
    
 
DOC 2: SASSA SCM DELEGATIONS 
 
1. Type of document: SASSA SCM DELEGATIONS 
2. Unique physical qualities of the documents: SASSA‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents:  th May 2015 
4. Author of the document: Mrs. Virginia Peterson 
5. Position: SASSA‟S CEO 
6. For which users  was the document written: SASSA‟s Head and Regional Office Staff 
7. What is the purpose of the document: 
 
In terms of section 56 of the Public Finance 
Management Act (1999), the executive authority 
may delegate certain powers to the designated 
officials within SASSA. This document contains 
the rules and conditions of these delegated 
powers. 
8. Why the researcher selected the document: To examine the SASSA SCM rules and 
conditions of the delegations in order to identify 
the risk of possible tax evasion within the 
SASSA SCM delegations. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for this 
document in particular: 
The analysis reviled that the risk of possible tax 
evasion was never taken into account when 
preparing this document, which makes the SCM 
internal controls ineffective to deal with the risk 
of possible tax evasion in the SCM processes. 
10. Website to access the document: http://home.sassa.gov.za/index.php?option=com
_phocadownload&view=file&id=571:scm-
delegations-in-terms-of-the-pfma&Itemid=2 
 
 
  
    
 
DOC 3:  CENTRAL SUPPLIER DATABASE INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. Type of document: CENTRAL SUPPLIER DATABASE INSTRUC-
TIONS 
2. Unique physical qualities of the documents: NATIONAL TREASURY‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents:   nd  April 2016 
4. Author of the document: Mr. Kenneth Brown 
5. Position: Chief Procurement Officer  
6. For which users  was the document written : All Accounting Officers of departments and the 
Accounting Authorities of public entities, of which 
in the case of SASSA is the Accounting Authority 
(the SASSA CEO). 
7. What is the purpose of the document: 
 
This document was written to improve the level 
of compliance in all areas including tax 
compliance and confirmation of the BEE status 
of the EME with CIPC. 
8. Why the researcher selected the document: To scrutinize the Central Supplier Database 
instructions in order to identify the risk of 
possible tax evasion within the instructions. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for this 
document in particular: 
The analysis revealed that there are no controls 
in the system to combat fraud and corruption 
activities including possible tax evasion. 
Example a person registering multiple 
companies to evade tax be-cause the tax status 
of the newly registered com-pany is always in 
good standing. 
10. Website to access the document: http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/Trea
suryInstruction/Instruction%20no%204A%20of%
201617%20Central%20Supplier%20Database.p
df 
 
  
    
 
DOC 4:  FRAUD PREVENTION STRATEGY 
 
1. Type of document: FRAUD PREVENTION STRATEGY 
2. Unique physical qualities of the documents: SASSA‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents:   th April 2015 
4. Author of the document: Mrs. Virginia Peterson 
5. Position: SASSA‟S CEO 
6. For which users was the document written: SASSA‟s Head and Regional Office Staff 
7. What is the purpose of the document: This document was written to outlines the 
SASSA‟s detail action to be taken to prevent and 
detect activities of fraud and corruption. 
8. Why the researcher selected the document: To understand the SASSA‟s fraud and corruption 
strategy and to investigate if the risk of possible 
tax evasion is covered in the strategy. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for this 
document in particular: 
The analysis revealed that the risk of possible 
tax evasion was never taken into account when 
preparing this document, which makes the SCM 
internal controls ineffective to deal with the risk 
of possible tax evasion in the SCM processes. 
10. Website to access the document: http://home.sassa.gov.za/index.php?option=com
_phocadownload&view=file&id=534:fraud-
preven tion-strategy-30-april-2015&Itemid=2 
 
 
  
    
 
Doc 5:  RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
 
1. Type of document: SASSA RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
2. Unique physical qualities of the 
documents: 
SASSA‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents: 10 November 2015 
4. Author of the document: Mrs. Virginia Peterson 
5. Position: SASSA‟S CEO 
6. For which users  was the document 
written: 
SASSA‟s Head and Regional Office Staff 
7. What is the purpose of the document: 
 
This document was written to outlines the process 
on how risk management should be conducted 
within SASSA to ensure that risks identified are 
assessed, ranked, prioritised and managed effec-
tively. 
8. Why the researcher selected the 
document: 
To understand the SASSA‟s risk management pro-
cess and to investigate if the risk of possible tax 
evasion has been covered in the process. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for 
this document in particular: 
The analysis revealed that the risk of possible tax 
evasion was never taken into account when 
preparing this document, which makes the SCM 
internal controls ineffective to deal with the risk of 
possible tax evasion in the SCM processes. 
10. Website to access the document: http://home.sassa.gov.za/index.php?option=com_p
hocadownload&view=file&id=542:risk-manage 
ment-strategy-2015&Itemid=2 
 
  
    
 
DOC 6:  2012 - 2016 SASSA ANNUAL REPORTS 
 
1. Type of document: 2012 - 16 SASSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2. Unique physical qualities of the 
documents: 
SASSA‟S LOGO 
3. Date of documents: 29 August 2016 (2015/16 SASSA Annual Report) 
17 July 2015 (2014/15 SASSA Annual Report) 
   July 2014 (2013/14 SASSA Annual Report) 
28 July 2013 (2012/13 SASSA Annual Report) 
22 August 2012 (201 /   SASSA Annual Report) 
4. Author of the document: Mrs Virginia Peterson 
5. Position: SASSA  CEO 
6. For which users was the document 
written: 
SASSA‟s Head and Regional Office Staff 
7. What is the purpose of the document: 
 
 An annual report is developed by the executive 
management once a year to give a comprehensive 
report on all SASSA‟s activities throughout previous 
year. 
8. Why the researcher selected the 
document: 
To investigate how successful is SASSA in terms of 
implementing the existing SCM internal controls 
and what are consequences of not complying with 
the SCM internal controls. 
9. What is the outcome of the analysis, for 
this document in particular: 
The analysis revealed that SASSA has not been 
implementing SCM processes, policies and 
legislation consistently and the consequences of 
not complying the SCM internal controls is the 
increasing trend of irregular expenditure. 
10. Website to access the document: http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-
centre/annual-reports 
 
    
 
APPENDIX F:  ETHICS-CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE 
  
    
 
  
    
 
APPENDIX G:  LETTER OF APPROVAL  
  
    
 
 
 
 
